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INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

TWO approaches to the text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* are used by many scholars today. The first is by way of historical and philological analysis. This method tends to dismember the text and reduce it to disordered fragments which are supposed to represent the different stages of Aristotle's thought, or of his school, or the vagaries of his ancient editors. Thus far no substantial agreement is to be found among the authors who have pursued this method. Is it not because the exegesis of a text must first of all be one which enters into the author's thought? Aristotle wrote as a philosopher, not as a philologist, and if we do not read him in his own light we are sure to " discover " contradictions where they do not exist.

The second method is to read Aristotle philosophically but still with historical preoccupations. The effort here is to show his position as a unique stage in human thought, different

from that of any other thinker. His must be seen as a "pure postion" opposed to other positions. Thus the problem becomes one of recovering the "genuine Aristotle" in contrast to his disciples or his commentators. This method leads inevitably to a minimizing interpretation, because it excludes from the account much that is implicit in the text, and turns differences of emphasis into differences in doctrine.

But if our concern with Aristotle is mainly philosophical, the historical approach can be regarded as merely ancillary, and then a third method is appropriate. This is to regard Aristotle as a *teacher* from whom we can learn something of the truth. When we approach him in this way we seek to grasp his meaning according to his own mind, with all its implications about the truth of things. We are not concerned about how he came to know what he is teaching, nor to compare him with other teachers, but to follow his lead and to see things which he points out and helps us to see. It is this third approach which I shall use in this article, trying to see what care the Philosopher takes to introduce the beginner to first philosophy.

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A careful study of Aristotle's metaphysics may raise in our minds more questions than the text itself seems to answer. Nevertheless, there is one point which stands out with particular clarity, and this is the caution with which we are introduced to the science of the first principles and causes of being as such. Aristotle does not lead us immediately into a sea of difficult questions where our minds must inevitably and hopelessly founder. He does not assume that we already know what the task is which we are trying to accomplish, or whether it is worth the effort, or whether other attempts have been made, or to what extent others have succeeded or failed, or whether it is genuinely possible, or how we should proceed with this final consideration of philosophic truth. Rather, he meets us on our own ground, and beginning with what we already know he leads us boldly on to an understanding of the ambitious inquiry which we are undertaking.

The introduction to a science is designed to render the beginner docile and eager to perfect his knowledge by his own effort together with the help of the teacher.[1] It is not expected that the ordinary student will be able to make progress in his studies unaided, particularly not in difficult matters. The reasonable way to learn is by cooperating with a teacher who already knows the scope and order of the discipline, who can distinguish between the known and the unknown, and who can point out the right path and maintain it with right reason. In order to begin a long and difficult course of study, the student must first of all be convinced that an understanding of the subject is useful for something or is even desirable for its own sake. Then the natural curiosity of the mind must be awakened by the challenge of earnest questions or by the clash of opinions about the subject of inquiry. Finally, the student must be confronted with real difficulties which enable him to appreciate his ignorance and to see clearly that he needs the help of his teacher in order to make direct and sure progress in learning. In a word, the beginner must believe that with the help of his teacher he can achieve knowledge which he sincerely desires to possess. Without the desire to know, he will do nothing. Without the conviction that the knowing, even though difficult, is really worth-while he will not desire to know. He will not hope to learn nor begin to study unless he believes that the learning, however difficult, is desirable and genuinely possible with the help of the teacher. The introduction to a science is aimed at arousing in the mind of the beginner these dispositions favorable to learning.

Now we shall try to follow our teacher as he introduces us to the science which we call metaphysics but which he called first philosophy, or simply wisdom. Aristotle begins with the challenging statement that each man naturally desires to know, in the sense of perfect knowing.[2] What this manner of knowing is and the general ways of achieving it, he has already analyzed

[1] St. Thomas, *de Anima*, lect. 1, n. 2.
[2] *Met.* A, 980 a23.

in his logical works, with which the student presumably has at least some acquaintance. Furthermore, he has analyzed natural things in general and human nature in particular throughout the physical, psychological and moral works, and with these also the student is supposed to be more or less familiar. Thus the opening statement is not merely an appeal to ordinary experience, but a challenge to recall the disciplines already learned, and an invitation to whet the appetite for something more and better.

Natural desire to know causes

Indeed, we love even sensory knowledge, and particularly seeing, not only because this knowledge is useful for the business of life but also because it is delightful and desirable for its own sake. Animals, too, have sensory knowledge, and in varying degrees. All of them have the sense of touch, and some, but not all, have memory. These are capable of a certain prudence and have an aptitude for learning, but only those which have hearing can be taught. Thus the animals other than man live by sensory discrimination and memory, and manifest little of related experience.

Over and above memory and experience, man lives by art and reasoning. Human experience arises from memories, and seems similar to art and science because it yields a certain skill. Yet experience is limited to the singiulars which have been perceived and remembered, whereas art includes knowledge of the cause. For the purpose of acting, experience and art may not seem to differ, although the man with experience does better in practice than the man who has the art without experience. This is because experience, like action, is concerned with singulars, while art is knowledge of universals which may not include the knowledge of singulars.

Nevertheless, we think that knowledge of the cause and the ability to solve difficulties pertains rather to art than to experience, and we suppose that artists are wiser than men of mere experience. This seems to indicate that wisdom depends more

upon knowledge of the cause than upon anything else. Those with experience do indeed know that something is so; yet they do not know why. But the wise know the cause and why it is so. Thus we think that the master-workers know more perfectly and are wiser and more honorable than the manual workers, not because of what they can do, but because they know the causes of the things which are made, whereas the others do not understand what they do, but act through mere custom. Furthermore, the sign of perfect knowing is the ability to teach, and this belongs rather to art than to experience. Nor do we regard any sensory knowledge whatever as wisdom. Even though the senses give us the best knowledge of singulars, still they tell us only that something is so, not why.

During the course of time men of genius have developed various arts not only for the production of useful things but also for pleasure. These men are admired and honored for their more excellent knowledge, and they are for this reason considered wise, rather than for the utility of their inventions. Later on, after many of these arts had been perfected to serve the needs and pleasures of life, the theoretical sciences were developed by men who had leisure for thought, and these men especially were reputed to be wise. Thus we see that what men have called wisdom is in all cases an excellence in knowing or acting, and particularly a knowledge of causes. For the man of experience is wiser than the man without experience and with mere sensory perception; the artist is wiser than the manual-worker; the architect is wiser than the mechanic; and in the theoretical or speculative sciences there is more of the nature of wisdom than in the active ones. Hence we conclude that wisdom itself, which is what we are pursuing, is the knowledge of certain causes and principles.

The reach of wisdom

If we consider the characteristics of the man who is called wise, we shall be able to determine what sort of causes and principles these are which must be known in order to possess

wisdom itself.[3] In the first place, a man who is wise knows all things, as far as is fitting—not everything in detail. He knows not just the things of ordinary perception, but things which are great and wonderful and difficult to learn. His knowledge is not doubtful but certain; he knows the causes of things; his knowledge is not merely useful but desirable on its own account; he is able to teach, and to persuade and rule others.

Now, the man who knows the most universal science which treats of the first causes of things and their principles has in an eminent degree the characteristics of the wise man. He especially is one who knows all things, because he knows all particulars in their universal causes. These causes are very great and difficult to know, because they are far removed from the nature of sensory things. The most universal science is most certain, because it is developed from fewer and simpler principles, just as arithmetic is more certain than geometry. This science gives us knowledge of the first causes of things, and is above all others desirable for its own sake because it attains to that which is most knowable, namely, the first principles and causes by which other things are and are known. It is most instructive because it is knowledge of the first causes, and authoritative because it extends even to the final cause, which is the supreme good and end of all. This science, therefore, which is wisdom itself, is knowledge of the first causes of things.

The dignity of wisdom

The science of first causes is theoretical knowledge, that is, knowledge for its own sake, not for the sake of production or action.[4] This characteristic of wisdom itself is clear from its very origin. The quest for knowledge of the truth is and was born of wonder. When those men of genius saw something which impressed them as unusual and great, and which they did not understand, they began to wonder about it and to inquire into its whys and wherefores. At first they wondered

[3] *Ibid.*, 982 a5.
[4] *Ibid.*, 982 b11.

about the more ordinary difficulties, but later they raised questions about greater matters, such as the appearance of the heavens and the origin of the world. They acknowledged that they were ignorant of these great things which they desired to know, and so they philosophized in order to escape ignorance. Even the lover of myths is in a sense a philosopher, that is, lover of wisdom, because the myth is composed of wonders. Thus it is clear that they were pursuing science in order to know the truth about things, not for mere utility. Indeed this kind of knowledge was first sought by men who already possessed almost all that is required for human life and comfort, and so it was sought for the truth itself, not for any other advantage.

Furthermore, this science is entirely liberal or free. Just as a man is free who acts for himself and as master of self, not the servant of others, so wisdom alone among all the parts of philosophy exists for its own sake and is the only free science, because it is the most universal science and treats of the first causes of all things.

Yet we must confess that this science is not a human possession. Knowledge so broad and free is not something which a man can master. Man can neither possess it perfectly nor can he use it when he pleases, because human nature itself is not perfectly free, but in many ways a servant of its needs and infirmities.

Nevertheless, this knowledge is most honorable and most desirable, because it extends to the first cause of all things, namely, to God, and is a sharing in the knowledge which belongs especially to God.

If we should be so fortunate as to attain this science of first causes, we must end in something which is the opposite of our starting point. We begin our search with wonder that things are as they are, but we must end in the contrary and better state, because we shall possess the truth and cease to wonder—though not entirely so, because we cannot perfectly possess the truth which we seek.

Other attempts to philosophize

In our study of physical science we learned that natural things have principles, causes and elements by which they are made and constituted. There we acknowledged four kinds of causes, namely, material causes together with formal, efficient and final causes. Now we shall consider what others who philosophized before us have had to say about the principles and causes of things, in order that we might either find some other kind of cause or be convinced that our account was sufficient.[5] A brief history of early Greek philosophy is possible, and is of permanent value because the problems and doctrines which were current then are typical of the main philosophical positions which have been taken down to the present.

The early philosophers agreed in assuming or admitting that there is some distinction between appearance and reality. They thought that the true reality of things lies beyond or within the passing show of mere appearance. However, they did not agree in determining what this genuine reality is, or how to account for the changing world. Some thought that the real stuff of the world is a fluid substance which abides under different shapes and forms, for instance, water or air. Others denied that there is anything stable, and asserted that the only reality is an ever-changing fire which is perpetually dying and flaring up again. Still others thought that things are not so simple, and that more causes are required in order to give a complete account of them. The world is so complex that we must admit many different kinds of things, and there must be a mover or cause of motion among them, and an intellect to put them in order. However, others thought that it is sufficient to admit countless atoms or tiny particles, all of the same kind, all falling in a void and by mere chance forming various combinations. Again, others thought that the numbers or mathemathical things are the genuine reality, and still others thought that this reality consists of species which exist apart from

[5] *Ibid.*, 983 b.

sensory things and which are somehow imitated or participated by sensory things.

Thus all the early philosophers admitted a material principle from which things are made and constituted. Some admitted also an efficient cause as the source of motion. Some admitted a formal or specifying cause which existed either in sensory things themselves or separated and apart from sensory things. No one, however, clearly admitted a final cause as a distinct kind of cause which moves and activates things by being loved or desired. Nor does it seem that anyone sufficiently explained the complex processes of this world by the causes which he admitted. About all these things many difficulties remain, and much more needs to be determined.

The possibility of attaining wisdom

At this stage of the inquiry the beginner knows that the way to philosophy is long and arduous, and he may even have doubts whether anything worth-while can be attained. He needs to be reassured that the search for truth is not hopeless, however difficult it may be.

In fact, from one point of view the attainment of truth is easy.[6] Each one of us can declare some truths about things, and what every one can do is not difficult. Even though the contributions of each individual may be slight, still from the investigations and discoveries of many a great store of truths can be collected. In this way, by patient and cooperative effort and sometimes by brilliant discoveries, the various arts and sciences have been wonderfully developed. Furthermore, each one of us naturally and easily knows the very first principles of all reasoning from which the arts and sciences proceed and which are the seeds of wisdom.

From another point of view the determination of truth is difficult for us. We cannot know everything at once, and it is hard to know both the whole and the part. Things are very complex, and we must first take the trouble to resolve the whole by patient analysis into its parts. Then we must investi-

[6] *Met.* a, 993 a30.

gate the simple parts in themselves. Finally to complete our task we must compose or synthesize the parts in relation to each other and to the whole. This work of investigating the truth is long and difficult not only because our intellects are feeble but also because many things are not well proportioned to our minds. Some things are so small or so imperfect that they are almost unintelligible, whereas others are so great and so perfect that they exceed our comprehension.

However, we can help one another in this quest for truth, and what is impossible for the individual is possible by co-operation with others. Those who succeed in the investigation of some truth can help others directly by sharing the truth which they have found. Even those who have not been able to determine the truth can help others indirectly, because through frank expression of opinion and reasonable discussion the truth more clearly appears. Indeed, we are indebted to the wise and the unwise, and we should give thanks to all who have aided us in the attainment of so great a good as knowledge of the truth.

The task of investigating truth is divided among the various arts and sciences, but not equally.[7] The arts, for instance, include knowledge of the causes of those things which we can make, yet this knowledge is not just for its own sake but for the work of production. The theoretical sciences are concerned with things which we cannot make, and so it is in these sciences that we seek knowledge for the sake of truth. We possess the truth about something when we know it as it is. But things are as their causes make them to be, and so in order to know the truth about them we must know their causes. Some things are variable and corruptible, and so the truth about them is likewise variable. However, there are also incorruptible things, and the truth about these is invariable. With greater reason, then, their causes are invariable and can be known with unchangeable truth. Thus as something is in regard to its being, so is it also in regard to truth. Now, in this science which is

[7] *Ibid.*, 993 b19.

wisdom we seek the first causes of being. Therefore, the investigation of truth pertains chiefly to this science.

Reply to a difficulty

But are the causes infinite in number or kind? If so, there are no first causes, and the search for them is bound to fail.

In reply to this difficulty we can admit that there are many causes of different kinds: efficient causes which are the dynamic principles of motion; material causes from which things are made and composed; final causes which are the goals of desire, for the sake of which something is done; formal causes by which things are of determinate kind or species. However, it is not obvious that the causes are infinite, and careful consideration will show that in each kind and series of causes there is both a first and a last. Therefore, ordered causes are not infinite in number or kind.[8]

In regard to motion and its efficient causes, it is manifest that there is something which is here and now moved, for instance, a stick or a stone, and this is moved by something else which is the mover. This mover is the proximate efficient cause in the ascending order, and is a mover moved by something else. Now, regardless of how many causes of this type there may be in the series, each is a mover moved, and is an intermediate cause. Each depends for its activity on another, not merely on another mover moved like itself, but on another which is a mover unmoved. This is the first principle of motion, the first efficient cause. Without the mover unmoved there could not be a mover moved, nor could there be any motion whatever. The series of movers and moved is terminated in a first unmoved and a last moved, and so is not infinite.

Among material causes there are different ways in which something is made from something else. In certain cases the changes are reversible, and in others they are not reversible. Where there is a natural order of succession within the same

[8] *Ibid.*, 994 a.

subject, with a determinate beginning, middle, and ending, as in the birth and maturing of an organism, the change is not reversible. Nor is it infinite, because it is terminated with something which is first made from something else and something which becomes last. In cases where there is no determinate order of succession, for instance, among elements and compounds, the changes are reversible. However, they fluctuate between extremes which are terminated, and so these material causes are not infinite. Likewise, when something is simply generated or corrupted, the change occurs between definite terms: the natural body in act becomes something potential, and this body in potency becomes actual. Therefore, material cases are not infinite in any given series.

In the order of final causes, there is something which is first done for the sake of something else, as a man walks in order to aid digestion. This is desired for something else, namely, health, and health is desired for happiness. In this order of causes there is something which is desired for its own sake and which is the only sufficient reason why each of the others is desired, without which nothing would be desired. Therefore, the order of final causes is terminated, not infinite.

In regard to the formal cause by which a thing is of determinate kind or species, this is signified by our definition of the thing. In defining we mention the genus and difference, and these terms are sufficient to express the essence of the thing. The definition is not improved upon if we multiply the terms, nor would things be knowable if the terms were infinite. However, we think that we do know when we have determined the causes, and this we could not do if the causes were infinite. Therefore, granting that we do know some things, the causes are not infinite in number, and it is genuinely possible for us to determine the first causes of things.

The need for proper method

But what method shall we follow in this strange venture? The fact is that there are different habits of thought and

language, and men seek and receive truth in different ways.[9] Our usual manner of thinking, whether natural or acquired, has great power over our judgment of details, because it is the customary that is intelligible, and that which is not customary seems somewhat unintelligible. Thus some persons prefer the mathematical way of thinking and speaking, and do not care to receive in any other way, whereas others refuse the abstract and intelligible and require a sensory example. Others mistrust their own judgment, and desire always to have the word of an authority. Some demand a most exact reason in every instance, whereas others are impatient of exact reasoning and regard it as quibbling.

Hence the student must be instructed before hand concerning the method of each discipline. He should not try to learn at once both the science and the method of the science, because it is very difficult to do both at once, and not easy to get even one of them. For this reason he should learn logic before any of the other sciences, and become familiar with the general way of proceeding in all sciences.[10] The method proper to each science should be considered near the beginning of each discipline. The exact procedure of mathematics should not be demanded in all sciences, but only in those which treat of things without regard to sensory matter. Hence the method of natural science is not that of mathematics, because natural things are subject to change and variation, and so cannot be known with mathematical accuracy. In natural science we must first determine what nature is, and then we can see what the proper subject of the science is, and what causes and principles must be investigated in the science.

Now we shall consider how we must proceed to develop this science of the first causes and universal truth of things. First of all we must set forth our questions and doubts before we try to determine the truth.[11] These doubts arise from two sources, namely, from what other philosophers have said about

[9] *Ibid.*, 994 b31.
[10] St. Thomas, *II Metaphys.*, lect. 5, no. 335.
[11] *Met.* B, 995 a23

the principles and causes of things, and from what they have overlooked and failed to consider.

Those who desire to investigate the truth should begin by doubting well, and should consider carefully the difficulties which occur, because the investigation of truth which follows is simply the solving of doubts or questions previously raised. A doubt in the mind is like a fetter of the body. Anyone who desires to untie his bonds must first examine them carefully to see how they are tied. In like manner, anyone who wishes to solve a doubt in his mind must examine all the difficulties and their causes. Indeed, one who wishes to inquire into truth without first considering the difficulties is like a man who does not know where he must go, and consequently does not know whether he should stop or go on. In like manner he who does not have a previous doubt which he wishes to solve cannot know whether or not he attains the truth which he seeks, because he does not know the goal of his inquiry, which is manifest to one who first knows his own question. Furthermore, the student is able to judge better the validity of the doctrine proposed if he knows from the start the reasons for the different views.

For these reasons Aristotle usually begins his instructions by proposing the doubts concerning the matter in hand. In this way the art of the teacher imitates nature, for just as nature stimulates us to learn by exciting wonder at great and unaccustomed things, so the teacher arouses and guides our desire to learn by the doubts and questions which he proposes.

But in his other works Aristotle asks only a few questions at a time, and then proceeds directly to solve them; here, however, he proposes all the questions at once, and later works out answers to them in an appropriate order. There are, perhaps, two reasons for this procedure.[12] First, because in this science we undertake a universal consideration of truth, and so we do not face merely a few particular questions, but must inquire universally about the causes of all being and all knowl-

[12] St. Thomas, *II Metaphys.*, lect. 1, nn. 343, 344.

edge. In the second place, the questions which are here proposed are the chief ones on which philosophers have differed. In his inquiry into truth Aristotle does not follow the same method which was used by other philosophers. He begins with sensory things, which are more manifest to us, and from these proceeds to immaterial things; whereas other philosophers attempted to apply intelligible and abstract notions to sensory things. Hence Aristotle preferred to list all the problems at once, and to solve them later on in their proper order.

The problems which pertain to a science are of two kinds, namely, problems of method and problems pertaining to the things which we desire to learn in the science.[13] In conformity with the general rules of procedure given above, Aristotle lists first the problems which pertain to method in this science, then the problems concerning things which we desire to learn in the science.

The general facts concerning scientific method and their proper reasons are set forth in the organon or works on logic, where the general requirements for scientific knowledge are analyzed, and we are shown how in general we must proceed in order to attain such knowledge. We think that we have achieved scientific knowledge of somthing, in the sense of genuine understanding, when we know the principles, causes or elements of things. Scientific knowledge is there defined as knowledge of the cause of something, knowing that it is the cause of this and not of something else, and that it cannot be otherwise.[14] Knowledge of this kind is had by demonstration, that is, by reasoning from principles which are true, first and immediate, prior and better known than the conclusion, and causes of the conclusion.

This kind of knowing is developed from three elements, which at each step must be previously known, namely, the principles, the subject which we investigate, and the attributes which can be demonstrated of the subject.[15] The principles are

[13] *Ibid.*, lect. 2, n. 346.
[14] *Anal. Post.* I, 71 b9.
[15] *Ibid.*, 76 b12.

of two classes, namely, general ones which hold for all subjects of investigation, and special ones which hold for particular subjects. Each subject for scientific investigation is in general a supreme genus of things, and includes all its parts or species.[16] In order to demonstrate the attributes of a subject, we must know that the principles which we employ are necessary truths, and we must know not only that the subject exists but also what it is, or what are its necessary causes, whether as a whole or in part. The attributes which can be demonstrated of a subject are the properties which belong to it by reason of its essential causes. This knowledge of the necessary principles and causes of a subject known as the necessary reasons for its attributes is the end of goal or scientific investigation.

The method of a science is proportioned to the end intended in the science. In a theoretical science, such as this one is, the end intended is knowledge of the truth concerning the principles and causes of the subject. The subject of a theoretical science is something which is not made by man, but which has its own principles and causes which can be known by us and through which we can demonstrate the attributes of the subject, both as a whole and in part. Therefore, the problems of method are concerned with the determining of the subject as a whole and in its parts, and with the principles which hold for the subject, and the causes which can be used as middle terms in demonstrating the attributes of the subject. Thus there are two sets of problems concerning method, namely, problems concerning that which determines the unity of the science as a whole, that is, concerning the causes or middle terms used for demonstrating, and concerning the subject itself with the principles which hold for it, and problems concerning that which determines the parts or divisions of the science, which correspond to the parts of the subject.

The end or goal of scientific investigation is knowledge of the principles and causes of the things which comprise the subject. Concerning these there is another set of problems,[17]

[16] *Ibid.*, 86 a37.

[17] *Ibid.*, 89 b21.

and we inquire first whether they are, then how they are, in order that we might determine what they are, and so demonstrate their attributes and the attributes of the subject. Finally, in view of the truth which we have determined, we can judge of the difficulties which remain.

Aristotle's list of problems

The problems of metaphysics which Aristotle lists are concerned with the method and the content of the science. He begins with problems concerning method, and inquires first about that which concerns the unity of the science, then about that which concerns the parts of the science.[18] Next he lists problems concerning the goal of our inquiry, asking about the first principles and causes: whether they are and how they are in truth, and in the opinion of others.

The problems concerning method are:

first, those concerning the unity of the science as a whole:

1. whether the investigation of the first causes belongs to one or to more sciences,
2. whether such a science should survey only the first principles of substance, or also the first principles of all demonstrations,
3. whether one science deals with all substances, or more than one,
4. whether all of these sciences are alike or are some of them forms of wisdom, others something else;

second, those concerning the parts of the science:

5. whether sensible substances alone exist, or others also besides them,
6. whether these others are of one kind, or are there several classes of them,
7. whether our investigation is concerned only with substances or also with their essential attributes,

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[18] *Met.* B, 995 b5.

8. whether we inquire into the general terms such as same and other, prior and posterior, etc.,
9. whether we must inquire not only what each of these is but also what are its attributes.

The problems concerning the goal of our inquiry are:

first, those concerned with the facts:

10. whether the principles and elements of things are the genera or the parts existing in each thing,
11. whether they are the remote or the proximate genera,
12. whether there is besides the matter anything that is a cause in itself or not;
13. whether this can exist apart from matter,
14. whether it is one or more in number,
15. whether there is anything apart from the concrete thing;

second, those concerned with their manner of existing:

16. whether the principles are limited in number and in kind, both the formal ones and the material ones,
17. whether the principles of perishable and imperishable things are the same or different,
18. whether all the principles are imperishable, or those of perishable things are perishable,
19. whether unity and being are the substance of things or are they attributes of something else—the hardest and most perplexing of problems,
20. whether the principles are universals or like individual things,
21. whether they exist potentially or actually,
22. whether they are potential or actual in any other sense than in reference to movement;

third, those concerned with the principles proposed by others:

23. whether numbers and lines and figures and points are a kind of substance or not,
24. whether they are separate from sensible things or present in them.

This list of problems can be arranged in outline as follows:



The problems concerning method relate to the efficient and formal causes of the science and to its subject matter. The unity of the science is determined in the order of efficient causality by the principles of demonstration, which include knowledge of the causes of the subject as proper middle terms, and in the order of formal causality by the proper subject of investigation. The parts of the science are determined by the parts of the subject, that is, the subject matter. The problems concerning the principles of things relate to the final cause of the science: the end or purpose of our inquiry.

How the problems are solved

In regard to all of these problems Aristotle admits that it is hard not only to determine the truth but even to make clear what the difficulties are.[19] These two things he attempts to do in the pages which follow. First he considers each problem dialectically, and manifests the difficulties which confront us in one way or another. Then he develops the science of first principles, this wisdom which we are seeking, according to the canons of correct method and the requirements of the subject, and he answers the difficulties in due course.

[19] *Ibid.*, 996 a15.

In order to develop a science, we must first determine the subject of scientific inquiry, that is, something which is knowable in a scientific way. A subject is knowable in a scientific way if we can determine its necessary principles, causes or elements, and can understand that these are the necessary reasons for the attributes, whether of the principles themselves, or of the subject, or of its parts.

Hence the first problems which must be solved are those which are concerned with the subject of the science and the subject matter; then the principles of demonstration and the causes of the subject must be determined; finally, the attributes of the principles themselves, and of the subject itself, and of its parts, must be demonstrated, and any difficulty which remains must be answered in view of the truth which has been determined.

Therefore, in developing the science which we are seeking, Aristotle first determines the subject of inquiry and the subject matter.[20] Since we are now seeking the first principles and causes of things in general, not in particular, then there must be something of which they are the first principles and causes, that is, some effect which is proportioned to the first principles and causes. This is not a particular kind of being, but being in general, or being as being, which has first principles and causes, yet is not itself the first cause or principle. Being as being includes not only the primary instance, namely, substance, but also the proper attributes of substance, and anything which is called a being and said to be in respect to substance as its primary subject. In this science we are seeking the first principles and causes of substances in general, whether sensory ones or not sensory, and of their proper attributes, and so this science is distinct from other sciences which treat of particular kinds and species of substances. For this reason it belongs to wisdom, not to any other science, to treat of the axioms or basic principles of all our knowledge. These principles of proof are related to everything

[20] *Met.* G, 1003 a17.

that is, and so to being as being. Consequently, Aristotle proceeds to explain and defend these principles of understanding, not by means of direct proofs, but by means of nominal definitions and indirect arguments.[21]

In the next place, Aristotle defines the terms which are employed in this science to signify not only the principles, causes and elements, but also the subject, its parts and its attributes.[22] There is special reason to consider the meanings of words in this science, because it is the most universal science and its terms are used in many different senses which must be carefully distinguished and set in order if we wish to avoid confusion.

After solving these preliminary problems, Aristotle begins to investigate the subject of the science. First he shows that the subject of this science is distinct from the subjects of the other sciences, whether theoretical or practical.[23] Here he admits that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, then natural science will be the first science in dignity; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior, and must be first philosophy. This is the science which treats of being as being, and of the attributes which belong to it as being. Then he distinguishes being as being, together with all that is proper to it, from accidental being and from being in the sense of being true, that is, logical truth. These he dismisses, and then proceeds to treat of being as being with the aim of determining its causes and attributes.

First he considers the essence of sensory substance and its definition in terms of genus and specific difference.[24] Next he considers the intrinsic principles of sensory substance, namely, matter and form; [25] then potency and act; [26] and then demonstrates attributes of substance.[27]

After this Aristotle reviews from natural science the things

[21] *Ibid.*, 1005 a18.
[22] *Met.* D, 1012 b34.
[23] *Met.* E, 1025 b.
[24] *Met.* Z, 1028 a10.
[25] *Met.* H, 1042 a24.
[26] *Met.* Q, 1045 b35.
[27] *Met.* I, 1052 a15.

which enable us to rise in thought from sensory things to the immobile.[28] Then he investigates the first extrinsic causes of being, namely, the immobile efficient and final causes. These he seems to identify in the necessary principle which is at once the unmoved mover, the necessary being and the necessary good.[29] On such a principle, he says, depend the heavens and the world of nature.[30] Here on the summit of thought Aristotle pauses to gaze in admiration and to deduce some of the attributes of the first principle. Then he argues that there are other immaterial substances with admirable attributes, and proceeds to manifest the order of being as such to its own inner harmony and to the first principle. Finally, he treats of mathematical things, which other philosophers have held to be the first principles. These he admits are substances, but they do not exist apart from sensory things.

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[28] *Met.* K, 1065 b5.
[29] *Met.* L, 1072 b10.
[30] *Ibid.*, 1072 b14.

TOWARD A THOMISTIC THEORY OF SENSATION

WHEN we investigate sense-intuition and interrogate its implications to the end of determining the extent of its contribution to our knowledge, we are not isolating ourselves in a "fine point" of philosophical inquiry. Such an investigation is as basic as it is subtle. Profound stirrings in the areas of philosophy of nature and metaphysics witness to this fact.

It is true that genuine physical theory, beyond certain epistemological involvements, no longer has philosophical pretensions. It is no less true that this acceptance of more modest boundaries does not begin to remedy positively the evil effects sustained by philosophy of nature in its unfortunate combat with the empirical sciences.[1] There can be little doubt that a crucial ground demanding rehabilitation is occupied by sense-intuition.

Long in the service of an exclusively quantitative and material analysis of objects, its role has been rigidly circumscribed. For the most part it has been reduced to registering pointer readings. Constantly checked against mechanical devices and increasingly supplanted by them, its testimony is neither expected nor desired to contribute positively to science at this level. With the recognition of the radical insufficiency of such knowledge, with the growing conviction that we have here only the corpse of reality, there is an implied demand for the restoration of a full, unimpeded natural activity to sense experience.[2]

Similarly, when some of our contemporary thinkers undertook the revindication of metaphysics, they found themselves

[1] J. Maritain, *Philosophy of Nature* (New York, 1951).
[2] V. Smith, *Philosophical Physics* (New York, 1950).

forced to begin by repudiating the Kantian equation of *a priori* and metaphysical knowledge. In thus opposing a "transcendental science" wherein ideas are altogether independent of a sensory origin and exercise a constitutive function which is in no way based upon the implications of perception, they have been led to re-examine the crucial part played by this initial moment of the knowledge act in a properly metaphysical approach and procedure.[3]

If, then, it is plain that a thorough reconsideration of sensation from every possible point of view is in order, it should be equally obvious that such a study is vast in scope and in need of data from many sciences. The present study does not pretend to be exhaustive. It considers sensation only under the aspect of its objectivity,[4] and this objectivity, in turn, only as it is presented in a selection of texts from Aquinas and his classical commentators.

However limited the area of this article may appear at first glance, there is reason to believe that within it is to be found that which is most basic to an adequate theory of sensation. When we affirm objectivity, we implicitly affirm those epistemological and speculative values so conspicuous by their absence in theories of knowledge whose point of departure is a rejection of objectivity. Moreover, we find that the reasoning of St. Thomas here, as in so many other instances, is a deep and fruitful mine, the exploration of which should lead us toward a true and comprehensive view of sensation in its relationship to the total meaning of human knowing.

[3] J. Owens, "A Note on the Approach to Metaphysics," *New Scholasticism*, XXVIII (4), 454-476.

[4] It must be noted that terms central to this discussion have suffered significant alterations in meaning. Thus, objectivity, intuition, and experience are today frequently regarded as having no reference to actual existents. Similarly, sensation is sometimes used to indicate purely internal affections rather than awarenesses of the external senses. If we are not to be hopelessly entangled in unresolvable difficulties of communication, we must insist at the outset that these terms be given their original and primary signification. Cf. L. Noel, *Le Réalisme Immédiat*, (Louvain, 1938), p. 205; F. Grégoire, "Notes sur les termes 'intuition' et 'expérience,'" *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* XLIV (1946), 401-415; F. H. Heinemann, "The Analysis of Experience," *Philosophical Review*, L (1941), 569; A. Hammond, "On Sensation," *ibid.*, L (1944), 260-285.

Objectivity of Sensation in St. Thomas

Because we do not find an *ex professo* examination of this question in Aquinas, we are forced to search out the relevant texts and, from a study of them, seek to determine his position. In establishing the order of this investigation, it was thought best to follow the lead given us in the actual experience of sensing. Such a procedure seems to avoid an arbitrary forcing of the texts while yet establishing an essential unity. At the same time it emphasizes an undeniable correspondence between the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor and this irrefutable data. Here, then, the significant moment appears to be that of the actual impinging of the datum on the sensory organ. In this contact, Aquinas sees the objective grounding of all human knowledge. Immediately discovered in it is the object as directly present and actually existing. We will consider first this *effectively exercised* activity of the sense-object and, following this, its immediate presence, its objective constitution, and its actual existence.

When he defends (against Plato) the hylomorphic unity of man, Aquinas lays out " certain ways by which human nature might be saved." Within one of these " ways " we find a statement of singular significance for us. It is directed specifically against the Platonic conception of the soul as mover and the body as that which it moves. A consideration of the sensitive soul in the act of sensing, observes St. Thomas, does not at all suggest such an agent-patient relationship. On the contrary, sense exhibits itself as a passive power which must be initially moved by an external stimulus. Thus he clearly affirms, in close agreement with Aristotle, the specifying element of all true sensations: the effectively exercised activity of an exterior sensible on the sensorial organ.[5] The same doctrine is emphatically and unequivocally repeated elsewhere: " If the organ of the sensing being is not moved by something outside, but by

[5] *II Contra Gentiles*, c. 57.

the imagination or some other higher power, there will not be a true sensation." [6]

It seems that we have here, in germ at least, the solution of the problem which has anguished philosophy since the advent of Descartes: do the senses attain real, objectively constituted beings, or are they confined to images and subjective modifications of the soul? If the sense power is passive and only actualized by an external stimulus here and now affecting it, the objective and existential validity of this same excitant would certainly appear to be assured.[7] In this very activity of the sensibly qualified thing on the organ, do we not immediately know it as existing, as directly present, as independent—in its very action and existence—of the sensing subject?

Having seen the passivity of the sense power with respect to its object, we are in a better position to understand the ground of the distinction made by Aquinas between the act of sensing and the acts of remembering or imagining: "Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present." [8] Obviously, for an immediate physical activity of the datum on the organ demands an immediate, physical presence. On the contrary, in neither remembering [9] nor imagining [10] is the object present in the here-and-now exercising of its existential act. Indeed, so essential to the specification of the act of sensing is the actual, direct presence of the object that John of St. Thomas—basing himself solidly on the texts of his master—affirms it impossible,

[6] *IV Sent.*, d. 44, q. 9, a. 1, sol. 3; cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, a. 8; *II de Anima*, lect. 12, 13.

[7] This objective validity is not incompatible with a certain relativity from the viewpoint of quiddity or essence. Cf. Maritain, *Les Degrés du Savoir*, 5th ed. (Paris, 1946).

[8] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 15, a. 2; cf. also q. 15, a. 1; q. 35, a. 1, ad 2; q. 14, a. 9; q. 78, 4; *De Verit.*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 8.

[9] *De Memoria et Reminiscentia*, Lib. Un., lect. 1, n. 306. "Ostendit quod memoria non est praesentis; sed hoc dicit pertinere ad sensum, per quem neque futurum, neque factum, id est praeteritum, cognoscimus, sed tantummodo praesens. . . ."

[10] *II de Anima*, lect. 6 ,n. 302. "Dicendum est igitur, quod animalia imperfecta, ut in tertio dicetur, habent quidem phantasiam, sed indeterminatam, quia scilicet motus phantasiae non remanet in eis post apprehensionem sensus; in animalibus autem perfectis remanet motus phantasiae etiam abeuntibus sensibilibus."

even to the divine power, to cause a sensation in the absence of an object.[11]

Because the sense organ is actualized only by an *actually* acting, present excitant, man cannot cause sensations at will. Commenting on the *De Anima* of Aristotle, Aquinas notes as a significant difference between scientific and sensitive knowledge that we are able to consider the object of a science at pleasure since we have it within ourselves, but that it is not in our power to sense a sensible object because such an object is not possessed in this habitual manner.[12] If, then, man can in no way cause true sensations, but is here rigorously dependent upon an effective extra-subjective stimulus, it can only be that, in true sensations, he is moved by what is objectively existing and objectively constituted. Now, inasmuch as human knowledge takes its rise from sense-data, this suffices to ground it in objectively existing things.

But are we able to say that a sensibly qualified thing here and now affecting the sensorial organ assures us of the actual, immediate presence of a *being*, a *natura habens esse?* Certainly existing beings *as existing* are not the *proper* object of a sense power. Must we not rather say, at most, that the intellect deduces or infers the existence of real beings from sense data? This is not the reasoning of Aquinas who, though distinguishing the powers of man, never morcellates man himself. Nowhere does the Angelic Doctor say that the senses *alone* know their objects *as existing*, nor the intellect *alone*, either, for that matter. In the *De Veritate*, he reminds us of a truth which all simple men know, but which some philosophers forget: properly speaking, it is neither the senses nor the intellect which knows but *man* who knows through both of them.[13] It is true that things *as existing* are not properly the object of the senses *as such*, but they are sensible *per accidens*: "When we see someone speaking or moving, we, through our intellect, apprehend him as living; hence, we are able to say that we *see*

[11] John of St. Thomas, *Phil. Nat.*, P. IV, q. 6, a. 1.
[12] *II de Anima*, lect. 12, n. 375, 376.
[13] *De Verit.*, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3.

him to live." [14] Now this apprehension comes about through the cogitative power, or particular reason: "It belongs to the cogitative sense to apprehend individuals as existing and as endowed with a common nature. Such a knowledge is possible only because of its intimate conjunction with the intellectual faculty to which it is united in one and the same subject." [15] We cannot forget, therefore, that in us the act of sensing is impregnated with intellectuality. Though analytically separable, they are functionally so continuous that no radical cleavage can be effected between sense and intellect in the actual exercise of human knowing. In sober truth, we must say that we know, in the very act of sensing, the excitant affecting the sensory organ "*ut existens.*"

To attempt to compass within a few pages the profound teaching of St. Thomas on the objectivity of sense-intuition would be presumptuous in the extreme. We have merely tried to sketch broadly what we believe to be the more fundamental aspects of his position. However, by viewing his doctrine again through the eyes of his classical commentators, we hope to illuminate in greater detail his two precious insights: a) there is given to us in the first shock of the sensible contact an *ens*, a thing known *as existing*: b) this existent is grasped *immediately* in an intuition at once sensible and intellectual. In Cajetan we will find careful determinations specifying the nature of this *ens*, and in John of St. Thomas an *approfondissement* of that intuitive act which apprehends it.

The *Primum Cognitum* in Cajetan

It is noteworthy that Aquinas fixes the proper object of man's intellect neither above nor below his human status: the proper object of our intellect is a nature having its "to be" in a concrete particular.[16] If there are some scholastics who confine the intelligence to a realm of existentially indifferent

[14] *II de Anima*, lect. 13, n. 396.
[15] *Ibid.*, n. 396.
[16] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 7, c.

essences, they have missed or ignored the Angelic Doctor's fundamental realism. Cajetan, well-schooled in the mind of his master, formulated this basic truth in a justly famous phrase. That which man knows properly and first of all is *ens concretum quidditati sensibili.* In the *Proemium* of his commentary on the *De Ente et Essentia,* he carefully develops its meaning.

There are three ways in which being may be known by us. According to the first, termed by Cajetan " *abstractio totalis,*" [17] we proceed potentiality-wise toward *ens* considered as being in general, the most universal of predicates. Now, *ens* so considered is, as it were, an all-embracing genus, which contains implicitly everything that in any way is; hence, it is the least specifying, least actual, and the least intelligible of all predicates. The reason is not hard to find. When, by remotion from the specific actualities of things, we aim simply at a more and more extensive visualization rather than at an essence or a nature, we arrive only at a common trait, an average. We may abstract " rational animal," for example, from man in a simple attempt to locate him in a larger class, or we may so abstract " rational animal " as precisely attaining the type of being that man specifically is, " the locus of intelligibilities " within him which is the object of a science. *Abstractio totalis* corresponds to the former act of thought that neglects those aspects (or, better, *inspects*) which specify a nature.[18] This *ens* of *abstractio totalis,* an *ens* of maximal vagueness, potency, and darkness, is not the *ens* of the *primum notum.*

[17] We note here a difference of terminology between Cajetan and the doctrine of Aquinas as stated in the *De Trinitate,* (q. 5, a. 3.). The *abstractio totalis* spoken of here is pre-scientific and, common to all sciences, it specifies none. The *abstractio totius* mentioned in the *De Trinitate* as proper to the first order of abstractive visualization, Cajetan includes within the *abstractio formalis,* for this is a scientific abstraction properly so-called. Cf. Maritain, *Philosophy of Nature* (New York), pp. 12-24.

[18] Cajetan, *De Ente et Essentia,* p. 7. " Illa autem abstractio non fit per considerationem alicujus quod sit de ratione materiae, et non per considerationem alicujus, quod sit de illius ratione: sed potius fit per separationem eorum, quae sunt de ratione formalis, ab his quae sunt de ratione materialis."

There is a second way of knowing being arrived at by an abstraction which Cajetan terms "*abstractio formalis.*" Here we proceed actuality-wise, aiming ever at the *ratio* of a thing. According to the degrees of this type of abstraction the sciences differ, for this is truly scientific visualization. Its direction is toward maximal specificity, actuality, and intelligibility. But this, again, is not the *ens* of the *primum notum.*[19]

If the *ens concretum quidditati sensibili* is neither the *ens* of *abstractio totalis* nor the *ens* of *abstractio formalis,* what is it? Cajetan answers that it ought now to be clear. Grasped in an act which is neither an abstractive isolating of its quiddity nor an abstractive remotion in the direction of a general class, this being is seen as immediately inscribed in and entirely enveloping the concrete particular. Though no phase or part of the sensible thing prescinds from it, it cannot be said to belong to it on the grounds of its very particularity. Were this so, it could not be found (as it is found) in each and every object of experience. Here three important precisions must be noted: the *ens* which is first given to the intellect is *seen in the thing,* but not as a partial view. It includes the *totality,* all that in it is.[20] (The totality in question is, of course, an *actual* whole, an existing being, not a universal or virtual whole.) Finally, this global knowledge is vague rather than clear. We have here, then, an analogical *ens* which, in this concrete realization, includes inchoatively the *ens* of metaphysics.

Gilson pays tribute to the classical formula of Cajetan, but he remarks that *ens concretum quidditati sensibili* does not do full justice to immediate realism, for "it is the concrete sensible itself which is known as being."[21] Before examining this observation, it seems necessary to point out a basic agreement: the *ens* of which Cajetan speaks is not something other

[19] This is not to imply that the *ens* attained in *abstractio formalis* is not derived from the *primum notum,* but that the latter contains the former inchoatively and not *as abstracted.*

[20] Cajetan, *loc. cit.*, p. 7. ". . . non est separatum aliqua dictarum abstractionum a quidditate specifica vel generica."

[21] Étienne Gilson, *L'être et L'essence* (Paris, 1948), p. 295.

than the concrete sensible to which Gilson refers. In the *Proemium*, as we have noted in the preceding paragraph, Cajetan clearly affirms that the object of our first concept is an *actual* being.[22] Moreover, it is the *totality* of that actual being, substance and accidents together, that is grasped as *being* in this initial act.[23] Hence, a careful reading of Cajetan reveals the *ens* of the *primum cognitum* as the subject of that perceptual judgment in which, as Gilson rightly insists, the concrete sensible itself is known as being.

What, then, does the French Thomist find wanting in this phrase which he nevertheless acknowledges as " justly famous "? It would seem that he fears a possible misreading, a misreading encouraged, perhaps, by the formula itself and aided, too, by our natural bent toward a kind of " spatialized thinking." We might, for example, consider this *ens* as a kind of substrate underlying the concrete quiddity or regard it as contained in sensible trappings somewhat as a gem is enclosed in a box. The error here is the failure to include the thing in its *total actuality* within being, an error against which Cajetan was, as we have seen, careful to secure himself. To cast a doubt upon the ontological content of the accidental determinations of beings given in experience is to imperil immediate realism itself. Inasmuch as Gilson forces us to take account of the precisions by which Cajetan himself clarifies the meaning of this phrase, he contributes in no small measure to a proper understanding of it. If, however, we view it within its context in the *Proemium*, the danger of a misinterpretation seems slight and the formula loses little, if any, of its excellence.

[22] Cajetan, *loc. cit.*, pp. 7-9. In opposition to the view of Scotus that the *ens* of an actual being cannot be known vaguely but distinctly only, Cajetan affirms as the *ratio* of this intellectual act: " quod intellectus feratur in objectum secundum id quod actualiter in eo, non penetrando ipsum."

[23] *Ibid.*, ". . . quandocumque intellectus, fertur in ens actualiter ipsum concipiendo et nesciendo separare ens a substantia et accidente, habet de ente cognitionem confusam actualem."

Sense-Intuition and John of St. Thomas

With John of St. Thomas as guide, we hope to bring together at this point the doctrine of Aquinas on the objectivity of sense intuition and Cajetan's reflections on the *primum cognitum*. The specfic contribution of the Portugese Dominican seems to invite such an effort, for he clearly affirms: a) the unique, indispensable role of the sense in directly, physically contacting the *ens concretum*; b) the precise nature of that intuition by which we grasp in their very act of existing the realities present to sense.

John of St. Thomas so translates the classic phrase of Cajetan as to leave no doubt regarding its particular, concrete reference. We are not speaking here of an abstracted *ens*, but *ens* " as concretized and inscribed in some determinate thing." [24] Now, what is it that is first of all known in this concrete totality? It is neither this singular precisely *as singular* nor its nature precisely as a quiddity. To say that the particular thing is known *qua* particular is to confuse the proper objects of sense and intellect.[25] But if *ens concretum* is not known as the senses *alone* would know it, i. e., singularly, neither is it known as the intellect *alone* would know it, i. e., quidditatively. In grasping the particular sensible, the intellect " does not prescind from its quiddity (for this is impossible), but it does not know it by penetrating its inner constitution and the causes of its being." [26] Having excluded both a merely sensitive and a purely intellectual grasp of the *primum cognitum*, we have but one alternative, an alternative which is, happily, in perfect agreement with the testimony of conscious experience.

In its first thrust, the concrete particular is known only with respect to whether it *is* (*quoad an est*), and this is to know it in that which is common to it in its singularity and in its nature.[27] Simultaneously and inseparably one, both sense and

[24] John of St. Thomas, *Phil. Nat.*, P. I, q. 1, a. 3.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*, " Hoc autem est cognoscere aliquid commune ipsi singulari et ipsi naturae;

intellect come into play here: sense, for without it no contact with particular existents is possible;[28] intellect, for "to be" will always escape the sense power considered only in its proper activity. Within the indissoluble unity of this act, it is possible, nevertheless, to signalize the crucial role of sense-intuition. John of St. Thomas has, in fact, emphatically done so. He seems to have deeply realized the urgency of paralleling Cajetan's *ens concretum quidditati sensibili* on the side of being with a *cognitio concreta sensationi* on the side of knowledge.[29] With vigorous insistence, he reaffirms the objectivity of sensation. More than this, inasmuch as a *purely* sensible intuition can neither explain our knowledge of particulars *as existing* nor ground experimentally our intellectual knowledge, he further specifies the nature of this intuition as not merely sensitive but *quasi-intellectual*.[30]

Ordinarily it is said that a sensation is impossible if the *species impressa* should fail, for any reason, to inform the organ. Properly understood, this would seem to be a sufficiently accurate statement, for the species radically depends upon the object both in its coming to be and in its preservation. By a simple process of elimination we may arrive at this fact. A species may be expelled: a) by a supervening contrary, b) by a defect of the organ, c) by a removal of the object. The first is impossible because intentional species lack contraries,[31] the second is eliminated automatically because we here presuppose the integrity of the organ in the sensing subject. Hence, it can only be that the removal of the object is the direct and

de utroque enim datur cognitio quoad an est, et sic *ipsum esse* seu *an est* ut concretum seu applicatum alicui singulari sensibili erit primum cognitum intellectus."

[28] *II de Anima*, lect. 12, n. 376. ". . . quia etiam sensibilia sunt *de numero singularium*, et eorum quae sunt extra animam. . . ."

[29] Gerard Smith, "A Date in the History of Epistemology," *The Maritain Volume of THE THOMIST* (1934), p. 254.

[30] John of St. Thomas, *Log.* II, q. 23, a. 1. "In sententia divi Thomae intellectus non habet speciem directam singularium, et tamen potest res singulares corporeas intuitive videre, *quando sunt praesentes per sensum*."

[31] John of St. Thomas, *Phil. Nat.* P. IV, q. 6, a. 1. ". . . species intentionales carent contrario, simul enim informant potentiam species albi et nigri, calidi et frigidi, odoris suavis et insuavis, aliquidem haec simul sentiri videmus."

immediate cause of the removal of the species. Continuous, immediate experience ratifies this fact. When the car just ahead of us passes over the hill, we no longer see it; when the singer finishes his song, we no longer hear it. Even in the event of a collision at some distance from us and whose sound reaches us only after a slight interval, it remains true that the *real* movement of the air continues, informing the organ so that it is an *actual*, present noise that we hear. It can be asserted without qualification, therefore, that a presence of the species is equivalent to a presence of the object, and a removal of the object inevitably involves a vanishing of the species.[32]

Although it is correct to say that an object cannot be sensed in the absence of its species, an important clarification is demanded at this point. Granted that, *naturally* speaking, a real presence of the object is required as immediately causing the species, is it not possible to the divine power to conserve the species miraculously, even in the absence of an object? The fact that it depends upon an actual being for its existence would seem to present no particular difficulty, for God who is the *Ipsum Esse Subsistens* is certainly able to supply it even in the absence of a real being. John of St. Thomas does not hesitate to say that this is not possible, not even to the divine omnipotence. When the external sense truly and properly elicits its act, it does not suffice that the species should be in the sense representing something as present; it is required that the object itself be present as terminating the act.[33] It is to be noted that the *species impressa* does not terminate the act of sensing; in the object alone which has its " to be " outside the one seeing,[34] every genuine sensation must be resolved: " Because it is from

[32] *Ibid.*, ". . . remota obiecto, species evanescunt et cognitio cessat."

[33] *Ibid.*, " Loquimur ergo quando sensus exterior vere et proprie elicit actum; et de hoc dicimus essentialiter postulare, quod obiectum exterius, in quod fertur, sit praesens physice, in quod talis actus immediate terminetur, nec sufficit quod species sit in sensu repraesentans aliquid ut praesens, sed requiritur quod ipsum obiectum praesens sit, ut terminet actum."

[34] John of St. Thomas here recalls the teaching of Aquinas (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 9). God cannot be said to have vision of possible things " because those things which are seen have their ' to be ' outside the one seeing."

these objects that all our knowledge takes its rise and in them that it is finally resolved, it must be that the external senses are first moved by these objects in receiving from them their species and that, in these same objects, knowledge should finally be terminated." [35] Here we note two moments, as it were, within the act of sensing: the first, a producing of the species in the sense, is assuredly possible to the divine power; with respect to the production of the species, the senses do not essentially demand the presence of the object.[36] The second, however, pertains to the very specification or *ratio* of sensation and, hence, cannot be supplied even by the divine omnipotence.[37]

The rigorous necessity of the real, physical presence of an object to terminate the act of sensation results from a two-fold condition: a) the external senses are ultimate among our cognitive powers and, as such, are the *only* source of experiential knowledge for us; [38] either we contact real beings through them, or we can never contact them at all; b) it is only in experience that our intellectual knowledge can be resolved; thus, this resolution in things *themselves* is the unique source of certitude in the human order of knowing.[39] Lest, however, we believe him to be merely postulating to save what must, at all costs, be saved, he invokes the compelling testimony of experience. If the presence of the object were not required, we could taste our food without touching it, and we could see as well in darkness as in light. To say such things, he remarks, is absurd, and with that he leaves the matter.[40]

[35] John of St. Thomas, *Phil. Nat.*, P. IV, q. 6, a. 1.

[36] *Ibid.*, ". . . moveri ab obiectis et procedere ab ipsis species effective, possit suppleri a Deo infundente vel producente speciem in potentiis loco obiecti. . . ."

[37] *Ibid.*, ". . . quod secundum suppleri non potest, quia pertinet ad specificativam rationem sensationis externae quatenus extra est."

[38] He is not speaking here of angelic knowledge which does not demand such a *resolutio* in things themselves: " Cum autem angelus certificetur per species desuper infusas, non habet experientiam de re quantum ad certitudinem cognitionis per resolutionem in ipsam rem."

[39] John of St. Thomas, *Phil. Nat.*, P. IV, q. 6, a. 1.

[40] *Ibid.*, ". . . si remoto obiecto externo posset sensus illud percipere, ergo posset

It would seem that the last word has been said. In view of the representationism initiated by Descartes, his contemporary, it is well for us that the great Dominican commentator considered the further question: do not the external senses form an image, a *species expressa*, that they might know their objects? [41] Although there is no necessity on the part of the object (i. e., it is neither absent nor immaterial), it would seem that the act itself, considered *as such*, ought to have a terminus. To this bit of seeming, John of St. Thomas opposes the text of Aquinas in the *Contra Gentiles* which points clearly to the immanent nature of this act.[42] The *ratio* of the act of sensing in no way demands a terminus beyond itself, for it is not a transitive action at all. The fundamental reason, however, which determines us here to a decidedly negative answer has already been adduced in other contexts, directed always to the saving of human knowledge from the same dead end.[43] There can be no mistaking it. What is at stake here is the ultimate validity of all our knowledge. If the object is not immediately attained here, it is simply not attainable by us.

If we grant that the external senses terminate directly in things themselves, must we not still ask how a *purely* sensible intuition can possibly suffice to ground *all* our knowledge? On the other hand, if intellectual cognition commences only with the concept, can we say that all our knowledge is ultimately grounded in experiential cognition? John of St. Thomas does not hesitate to make this latter claim,[44] nor does he shrink from speaking here of a *quasi*-intellectual intuition terminating in real beings by means of sensation.[45] This is the only intuitive

oculos in tenebri videre et posset gustus et tactus obiectum non contactum sentire, quae omnia absurda sunt."

[41] John of St. Thomas, *Phil. Nat.*, P. IV, q. 6, a. 4.

[42] *I Cont. Gent.*, c. 100. "Dico autem operationem in ipso manentem per quam non fit aliud praeter ipsam operationem sicut videre et audire. . . ."

[43] John of St. Thomas, *Phil. Nat.*, P. IV, q. 6, a. 4. ". . . quia cognitio sensitiva essentialiter est experimentalis, experientia deducta ab ipsis obiectis et ex motione eorum in sensus. De ratione autem talis cognitionis est, ut in illam ultimate resolvatur omnia nostra cognitio utpote ab ipso inchoata."

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] John of St. Thomas, *Log.* II, q. 23, a. 2.

intellection accessible to us.[46] Experience everywhere and always affirms it as a fact, and abstract knowledge demands it as its *alpha* and *omega*, if it is to be something more than a dream.[47]

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[46] The *a priori* intuition postulated of human knowledge by Kant is ascribed to angelic spirits by John of St. Thomas. He notes, also, a misinterpretation of Cajetan which would deny the intuitive character of all knowledge involving a *species* or *verbum*. cf. *Phil. Nat.*

[47] When John of St. Thomas undertakes the experiential validation of our intellectual knowledge, he does so by intimately relating two classical Thomist doctrines: the indirect knowledge of the singular and the *conversio ad phantasmata*. "Licet intellectus noster non habeat speciem impressam directe repraesentantem singulare, habet tamen *ex adjuncto ordine et reflexione ad phantasma conceptum proprie repraesentantem illud* . . . et hoc sufficit ut dicatur habere notitiam intuitivam rei praesentis." (*Log.* II, q. 23, a. 2.)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND THE STABILITY OF CIVILIZATIONS

MY purpose is to examine philosophically the cycles of growth and decline of past civilizations in order to see what it is that has prevented these societies from being stable, and to discover the means that would cause a civilization to be stabilized in its growth. The reader will see that the essay is based on the studies of the problem made by Professor Toynbee. He has shown convincingly in the latest volumes of his *Study of History* that there are no laws of historical cycles by which mankind is inexorably bound to live through one civilization after another, that is, to undergo one such historical cycle after another.[1] He does not, however, definitely answer the question as to the source of regularities in the history of civilizations. Instead, using the terminology of C. G. Jung, he mentions the possibility that cyclical "laws" of history may be imbedded in the collective unconscious of man.[2] Consequently, he does not propose as definite a solution as he might to the problem of cycles.

In carrying the work of Professor Toynbee further in these pages, I take the opportunity of utilizing the philosophy of history as I understand it. At the beginning I describe what the philosophy of history seems to be to me and then I apply it to the problem. In turn, the analysis of the question of cultural stability enables me, in the last pages, to clarify further the nature of the philosophy of history. The reader will find that my view of the philosophy of history is decidedly ethical and that the virtues and their derivatives occupy the central place

[1] A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Oxford, 1934, vols. i-iii, 1939, vols. iv-vi, 1953, vols. vii-x), Vol. IX, pp. 338 ff.: "Are Laws of Nature Current in History Inexorable or Controllable?"

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 328 ff.

in the scheme. My theories on the philosophy of history have been caused in part by the work of Professor Toynbee. Yet he is, as he has told me, an historian, not a philosopher by training, and the profound and obscure philosophy of history that lies in his work is the result, not of philosophical speculation, but of humane and empirical study of history, characterized by a deep religiousness. I think the philosophy of history, described philosophically below, *secundum quid*, is a continuance of that of Professor Toynbee. The definitely Christian and Catholic orientation of my theory is opposed to the indefiniteness of his religious views, but that does not prevent mine from being the continuance of his philosophy.

In using the term *civilization*, I am taking a word which was not used until the eighteenth century and, like the term *culture*, did not signify " society " until the nineteenth century.[3] But I do not use the term, *civilization*, in a special sense which would distinguish between a civilization and a culture; rather, I follow the usage of Professors Maritain and Toynbee, who prefer to make the two terms synonymous. The words, *civilization* and *culture*, do not only indicate a special quality of a society or commonwealth, but also signify the general society or commonwealth itself.[4] It seems to be more faithful to the way in which the facts of history really happen to assert the identity of culture and civilization instead of any difference between them.

I. The Need for Philosophy of History

The philosophy of history, as I understand it, is the fourth part of a " quadrumvirate " of four ethical disciplines, *Monastica* (personal ethics), *Oeconomica* (domestic ethics), *Politica* (political ethics), and *Historica* (cultural ethics). I assume

[3] Cf. *civility, civilization* and *culture* in: *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, edited by J. A. H. Murray (Oxford, 1893), Vol. III.

[4] *A Study of History*, Vol. III, p. 221 n. 3; J. Maritain, *True Humanism*, trans. M. R. Adamson (London, 1950), p. 88. However, it is important to distinguish between what Professor P. A. Sorokin calls the " meaningful " and the (efficient) " causal " aspects of the civilization; or between what he also terms the " cultural

that, just as the ethical training of a person in regard to personal matters needs to be supplemented by training in the domestic and the civil virtues, so too, the ethical training of an individual in civil matters needs to be fulfilled by a training in the cultural virtues. Sanctity can express itself not only in personal, domestic and political courage (say, that of patriotism), but also in a cultural courage. That is to say, there is the good of the state beyond one's private good, and there is the good of the civilization or culture above and beyond the good of the state. Though a person may possess piety in the line of patriotism, he may be vicious in respect to the culture and civilization of which his parochial state is only a part.[5] I call this ethical point of view a philosophy of history; it is not exactly a philosophy of politics, and it is a philosophical fulfillment of the study of history. Political science is traditionally limited to the study of a small part of history, and it is universally separated from history in the division of departments in the liberal arts college. It is not unreasonable, on the face of it, to look for a philosophy which especially fulfills the study of history.

A. *The Amplitude of Philosophy of History*

Historica, the philosophy of history I have referred to, is partially a science of politics, having for its object the culture or civilization instead of the national state. Yet, though it is in part political, there comes to mind a number of reasons why *Historica* might well have a distinct place alongside of *Monastica, Oeconomica* and *Politica* in a general division of ethics.

and social systems," Sorokin, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis* (Boston, 1951), p. 205; or between what Professor J. Maritain calls the "community" and the "society"—*Man and the State* (Univ. Chicago, 1951), p. 27—or between what may be termed "order" and "jurisdiction."

[5] The late Professor N. Berdyaev has expressed this moral pointedly: "No one can ever clearly explain and justify the fact that undoubted vice and sins in an individual person—pride, self-conceit, egoism, cupidity, hatred, blood-thirstiness, brutality, lying and theft should assume the appearance of virtues and gallantry in the state and nation, nor can any one justify their doing so." *Slavery and Freedom,* trans. R. M. French (London, 1943), p. 142.

First, it distinguishes between the virtues of a citizen as such and the virtues of the person inasmuch as he participates in a community that is less tangible, more noble and more complex than a national, provincial or municipal state; that is, it distinguishes between what I term the political virtues and the cultural virtues. The cultural virtues, to speak only philosophically, are those grouped around charity and the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, and particularly the higher virtues which are associated with justice, such as religion and piety.[6] If cultural ethics were simply made part of politics (as it is in Plato's *Laws*), then religion would be ordered under politics. In a Christian society this outlook would tend toward a caesaro-papism not unlike that which has plagued Eastern Orthodox Christianity.

Cultural virtues, as I understand them, have the culture for their object; and I mean by *culture* the synthesis of economic, social, political, artistic and philosophical things that pertain to a civilization, all of which are more or less vitalized and coordinated by at least a natural religiousness.[7] As a matter of fact, no higher culture or civilization has ever achieved its cultural accomplishments and perfections in any duration less than several hundreds of years. Further, as a matter of fact,

[6] St. Thomas Aquinas makes a detailed analysis of the virtues "potentially included in justice" (those named by Cicero, religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth), *Summa Theologiae* II-II, qq. 80-103.

[7] Even the virtue of religion itself has cultural matters for its object, although God is its end. St. Thomas says concerning the virtue of religion: "Now due worship is paid to God, insofar as certain acts whereby God is worshipped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object but as end; and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end." (*op. cit.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 6 *corpus.*) As Holy Scripture says: "the sons of Israel all alike began making their contributions to the Lord with readiness and devotion of heart." Matthew 18:20. Insofar as it is cultural, religion is the cultural virtue *par excellence. Non orans privatur optatis, sicut negligens cultor, privatur fructu agri*: (Annotation, *Summa Theologiae,* II-II, q. 83, a. 1, n. 1 Marietti Edition, 1948) and this may be understood in a natural sense as well as supernatural like sacrifice: *oblatio sacrificii pertinet ad ius naturale* (*op. cit.*, q. 85, a. 1.), the obligation of sacrifice is an obligation of natural law as well as divine law.

no higher civilization has ever manifested itself in any society which was not formed of many more or less autonomous states. Consequently, the understanding of the nature of culture presupposes an historical study of culture. The philosophical knowledge of a cultural ideal (a complete culture) must include temporal and spatial knowledge in somewhat the same sense that a philosophical study of human nature must contain references to " before and after " or " here and there " in the spiritual and bodily functions of man in his span of earthly life. Such a cultural ideal (a complete culture or civilization of indeterminate duration) is the object of the cultural virtues and vices. This is exactly the reason why the definitions of the cultural virtues and vices have a temporal and social, as well as spiritual, amplitude not to be found in the personal and political virtues and vices.

Let me give an example of a vice. Besides the untoward rivalries and envies which happen on a strictly political level, there are envies which occur on a cultural level. Thus Professor Jung has said that the two schools of philosophy, the Cynics and the Megarians, manifested a widespread envy of everything that Plato and his kind held sacred.[8] Besides the envy of a less cultured society which the Megarians evinced for their conquerors, the Athenians, there was also the envy of the Cynics, the followers of Antisthenes, the proletarian and nominalist,—an envy shown for the culture Plato had lived and taught. Illustrated here are two commonplace occurrences of cultural envy: that assumed by a political state for a finer commonwealth and that imbibed by a social class for a superior society. Shown also are two consequences of the vice: the division between member states of the civilization and the schism between social classes.

Second, the historical and temporal breadth of outlook in philosophy of history far exceeds that traditionally found in political theory.[9] Indeed, the philosophy of history looks not

[8] C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types* (London, 1946), pp. 88-50.

[9] Professor E. Voegelin, in his book, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago, 1952), p. 1, although asserting the distinction between a theory of politics and a

only past the good of the national state to that of the civilization, but also past the good of any one planned civilization. Ultimately, it looks to the cultural good of all humanity, the most universal human good on the natural or profane level, and points to, seeks to be fulfilled in, a still higher domain where it cannot enter as pure philosophy; namely, the domain of the *Civitas Dei,* of which temporal society might be a province or suburb. *Third,* such an ethical doctrine has a good deal in common both with the assertions of some famous philosophers of history and with the findings of eminent historians. There is, for example, a dependence upon a comparative study of civilizations in this cultural ethics as there is likewise, in other studies and philosophies of history. Examples may be found in the philosophies of Vico and Spengler, both of whom have abstracted the characteristics common to several civilizations.[10] *Fourth,* to the degree that it finds guiding and ordering principles common to historians, it provides a guidance and order for the writing of history (that is, the political and social history which is ordinarily taught in colleges). I do not mean that the philosophy should replace the facts as the source of historical knowledge.[11] But, incidentally, it brings under the light of philosophic reason those more or less hidden presuppositions, intentions and urges that motivate the work of historians. For

theory of history, has stressed the unity of one with the other. "The existence of man in political society is historical existence; and a theory of politics, if it penetrates to principles, must at the same time be a theory of history. . . . An inquiry concerning (political societies as representatives of a transcendent truth), if its theoretical implications are unfolded consistently, will in fact become a philosophy of history."

[10] Cf. G. Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico,* trans. T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch (Cornell Univ., 1948), pp. 313 ff., nn. 947 ff; O. Spengler *The Decline of the West,* trans. C. F. Atkinson (New York, 1939), Tables, pp. 429 ff.

[11] Historians point out that a personal set of values does influence historical writings. But the historian's philosophy of life and his values do not prevent the historical facts and sequence of events from directing his historical account of *"wie es eigentlich gewesen"* (Ranke). For example, Professor M. Mandelbaum has "shown that regardless of the theory of values one accepts it is fallacious to hold valuational judgments determine the content of historical knowledge." *The Problem of Historical Knowledge* (New York, 1938), pp. 190 ff.

example an "historical fact" has essentially a cultural quality and philosophy can clarify this.

B. *The Inadequacy of Historical Science*

The teaching of social and political history through the media of lecturing in the classroom and publishing in the literary world fails to achieve its purpose unaided, namely, that of correcting the present under the guidance of the past. The trouble for the common man has lain in the unassimilability of the vast amount of details, public events and human relations which have shaped the explanation and narrative of historians. For the ordinary man, the contingencies of *private* life and of life under the laws and customs of a *state* present no great difficulty. Each person has his outlook; he knows on the whole what a just, honorable course of conduct is. But it is quite otherwise with the comprehensive relations that history has to do with. Social and political historians, whatever their ultimate purposes were, have—if conscientious—mirrored in their own works the complexity of historical events. If a philosopher of history were to use the method of the historian, his philosophy would fail to reveal clearly or teach effectively the ethical lessons of the past because it would be too erudite in history. A man acting as historian *and* philosopher, led by the very generality of his outlook, would impose a tremendous burden of erudition on the student of his philosophy, an imposition which the ordinary man is incapable of receiving. It follows, therefore, that social and political history itself, with all the attention it must faithfully give to the significant concrete historical facts, cannot be a satisfactory substitute for philosophy of history. Even in the hands of the philosopher, the method of history defeats the purpose of philosophy.

II. The Source of Historical Declines

The philosophy of history is immediately concerned with the good of civilization and with the moral virtues (and vices) that pertain to it. But, as a matter of fact, the outstanding

problem of the study at the present day is the question: how can Western or any other Civilization avoid the decline and death that has been the fate of many preceding cultures? The question is more important in the degree that mankind has the power to kill itself universally by means of atomic bombs. The obvious fact of growth, decline and fall that has occurred in several civilizations in the past can be expressed by the term, "historical cycles." Then, I may state the problem: what can the Christian philosopher do to break and end the succession of historical cycles in which past civilizations have declined and fallen? For it, as St. Augustine says, this world is a school house, and a "seminarium [exercitium]," then these historical cycles belong neither to the divine nor the human order. They would seem to have deficient being; in themselves they seem to be evil. Yet, so compelling is their presence in history that the ancient Greeks and Romans, taking a lesson from the physical world, universally argued that the spiritual and political world of man is eternally subject to its own cycles. As for us, like the ancients, we are faced with the stubborn fact of the past existence of historical cycles. If the philosophy of history that I have been developing, and if the cultural virtues which I mentioned, can truly serve the good of a civilization, the first problems to which that philosophy must address itself are those of the source, prevention and cure of historical cycles.

A. *The Nature of Historical Cycles*

The morphology of higher cultures or civilizations, in particular the similar movements of growth and decline in different civilizations, has been studied extensively in modern and contemporary times. Professor Toynbee, in his *Study of History*,[18] having enumerated some 600 primitive societies, enumerates 21 distinct civilizations in historical times, of which five survive today,[19] and he has discovered certain characteristic activities

[18] St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. 21, Chap. 15.
[19] Toynbee, *op. cit.*
[20] *Ibid.*, Vol. IX, p. 181 f.

and catastrophies which have been common to many fallen civilizations. At the risk of trying the patience of the reader I will present some pertinent findings of Toynbee; it is necessary for me to do this because it makes possible the discovery of the source of historical cycles.[15]

If we study the history of past civilizations we can note the following: After several hundred years young civilizations enter upon a" time of troubles," which is characterized especially by the advent of unusually great wars; again, after 400 years more the disintegration of a civilization has proceeded to such a point that it succumbs to the rule of one " universal state " in which certain cultural bonds holding the civilization intact are replaced by the military bonds of a more or less benevolent despot. After 400 more years the moribund civilization often loses its self-identity and often disappears. The process of disintegration, from the beginning of the time of troubles, is marked by a well-spaced succession of historical catastrophies; the most obvious events are the extreme destructions of war. For example, in the Hellenic (both Greek and Roman) Civilization, the Atheno-Peloponnesian War instituted a time of troubles, and the Roman civil wars of the first century B. C. terminated the troubles in a universal state. These catastrophic events are called routs or relapses, and they are followed by historical acts of partial regeneration which are called rallies. There have been an equal number of routs and rallies in the civilizations which have fallen; the number is $3\frac{1}{2}$, the last relapse, that of the death agony of the universal state, not being followed by a rally. Fallen civilizations have had two main periods, one of social growth and one of social disintegration; and the period of disintegration has had two parts, the first, the time of troubles and the second, the age of the universal state. Empirical study reveals that in the fallen civilizations each (if not cut off by an alien intruder) has taken

[15] For the remainder of the paragraph following, except where indicated, I draw upon the summary (" Argument ") of Toynbee's *Study*, presented by D. C. Somervell and A. J. Toynbee: *A Study of History, Abridgement of Volumes I-VI* (New York, 1947), pp. 567-589.

nearly exactly 400 years to run out a time of troubles and an additional 400 years to go through the period of the universal state.[16]

For example, the Solonian economic revolution in Athens had produced in the eighth and seventh centuries B. C. a commercial economy in the Hellenic city-states. The political isolation of the individual member states of the civilization was made unfeasible by their new economic interdependence. The effort to transcend the city-state political sovereignty and isolation provoked extreme resistance and this ensued in the breakdown of the civilization.[17]

In the Hellenic Civilization this first rout occurred 431 B. C., the time of the outbreak of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War. The first rally consisted in the attempts, in the 50 years prior to the Hannibalic War in 218 B. C., to reinvigorate and unify politically the civilization. The first relapse occurred during the century of castastrophic warfare between Rome and other states and within the Roman Commonwealth (218-31 B. C.). The rule of Augustus, a second " rally " established a universal state. 400 years had elapsed between 431 and 31 B. C. A third relapse of the Hellenic Civilization occurred in the collapse after the death of Marcus Aurelius in A. D. 180. The last " rally " began with the accession of Diocletian in A. D. 284, and the final collapse of the civilization ensued in A. D. 378. About 400 years had elapsed between 31 B. C. and A. D. 378. $3\frac{1}{2}$ beats of routs and rallies measured the decline of the culture in the 800 years from 431 B. C. to A. D. 378. This 800 years of disintegration is divided into a time of troubles (400 years) and a universal state (400 years).[18]

There is a peculiar and ominous significance in the regularity of these figures, and also in the regularity of the number ($3\frac{1}{2}$) of routs and rallies that occur during the 800 years of social disintegration. Besides these, there are other cyclical regularities in human transactions, particularly in the intervals of

[16] *A Study of History*, Vol. VI, p. 327; Vol. IX, pp. 289-291.
[17] *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, pp. 201-203.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 287-291, " The Rhythm in Hellenic History."

war-and-peace in several civilizations, in the business cycles of an industrialized Western society and in various discernible rhythms.[19]

B. *The Dynamism of History*

The history of a civilization is a human history whose movement, for better or for worse, has its dynamic wellsprings in the volitions of man. Man's power to seek real or apparent " goods " for his personal, domestic, civil, national or cultural satisfaction, virtuously or viciously, causes history to move. Every past civilization, it seems, tended to progress from one set of outlooks and ambitions to another and from one revolution to another. There can be no explanation of this motion, except that the members of each civilization pursued a successive series of " goods," ends or purposes, each differing from the other, the earlier goal becoming less attractive than those that replaced it. It is far beyond the limits of the present study to determine specifically the succession of main " goods " through which the members of a falling civilization proceed. But we can observe that there are *serials* of personal, domestic and political (and even cultural) " goods," which serials have been similar in several fallen civilizations, and that the *parts* of the respective serials—the goods—have been similar too. Thus the Indic, the Babylonic, the Andean, the Orthodox Christian, the Minoan, the Hindu, the Far Eastern and the other civilizations have had similar serials of succeeding ideals, and the ideals, the " *goods* " have been similar too. An example of an ideal or " good " is that of egalitarianism. Thus Paulicianism arose in Asia Minor in the ninth century when the Orthodox Christian Civilization was declining. The strength of the Paulician egalitarian ideals is to be seen in the Albigensian heresy of the mediaeval Western Civilization; for the Albigensians were inspired by Paulician notions.[20]

If we make a general and rapid reconnaissance of these

[19] *Ibid.*, Vol. IX, pp. 322, 223-234, 291-295.

[20] Cf. *The Decline of the West*, Vol. I, p. 294, Table I. Vol. II, p. 425; *A Study of History*, Vol. IV, pp. 364-369, 624-634.

purposes and " goods " in the fabric of history, we will be able to see the need of the philosophy of history that I am proposing. In all branches of ethics, in the cultural as well as in the political, domestic and personal, we are concerned not only with those goods that are fully good, but also with those " goods " that mask the face of evil. In order to discipline himself in the virtues which dispose him toward the good, man has also to study the greater and lesser goods and the vices. If we consider briefly the history of civilizations, in this light, our survey becomes at the same time a preface in cultural ethics.

C. *Characteristics of Growing Civilization*

Past civilizations have originated in the anarchic scraps and remnants of previous societies.[21] Thus the Hellenes developed a civilization of city-states following upon the barbaric anarchism of a Post-Minoan interregnum. New civilizations have manifested their unity of outlook in many ways, religious, political, artistic, intellectual, etc. There is an awareness of the civilization and of the surpassing excellence of the social and political institutions which have come into being. Indeed, we may speak of an invigorating and pious exultation of man in the goodness of the social and political forms and customs by which the new civilization has manifested itself. That moving force of historical progress which we found to be the volitions of man is now a desire for personal, domestic, political and cultural perfection, which at the same time more or less religiously *exults* in the excellence that the culture has already discovered. We find a greater and finer exultation in Christian civilizations than in the pagan because, whereas the latter have had only the experience of natural religions, the former have had the inspiration of a Divine revelation. It is this life-giving *exultation,* founded in at least some degree of religiousness, an *exaltation* of established social and political forms (such as aristocracy or any rooted institution), which outstandingly

[21] Cf. for example, *ibid.*, Vol. IX, pp. 291-2.

characterizes the growth period of a civilization. And perhaps the absence of this exultation, this great satisfaction with existing traditions, is the most outstanding characteristic of a civilization which had proceeded considerable on its decline. Such an exultation may be conscious and aware of itself in the most enlightened leaders of the culture, or, in the members of social classes who actively participate in the life of the civilization, it may, in a later and cooler age, be only symbolic and work metaphorically. Thus there are many symbols in an aristocratic society. St. Thomas Aquinas wrote of this symbolism in the thirteenth century: " Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own virtue, but also for another's; thus princes and prelates are honored as standing in God's place, and as representing the community over which they are placed." [22]

Exultation is nothing if it is not a personal satisfaction with the object of human volition. And it is precisely a collective and harmonious satisfaction in the various human goods that a study of a growing civilization reveals. " A growing civilization can be defined as one in which the components of its culture—an economic element, a political element, and a third which may be called the cultural element *par excellence*—are in harmony with one another; and, on the same principle, a disintegrating civilization can be defined as one in which the same elements have fallen into discord." [23] It follows that if the numerous " goods " sought and enjoyed by the members of a civilization, are in harmony with, reinforce one another, a greater cultural satisfaction (or exultation) will exist in those persons than in the members of a disintegrating society. But a harmony exists in the culture only if there exists an order that transcends the parochial states and classes that belong to the culture.

History shows us very clearly that a reasonable order and a

[22] *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 63, a. 3, *resp.* This statement occurs in St. Thomas' treatise on the moral virtues potentially included in justice; namely, religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance and truth.

[23] *A Study of History*, Vol. IX, p. 7.

more or less true ethical norm coordinates (*cum granis salis*) all the aspects and activities of the social life of a growing civilization. In contrast, such a norm does not order the actions of a declining civilization (aside from the activities of individual persons, families, groups or particular nations).[24] A cultural norm of this kind (a truly ethical norm in Christian commonwealths) is really present in the growing civilization, even though the cultural leaders may be unconscious that their religion or ethics implicitly includes it as well as political, domestic and personal norms. Such an end can most truly operate in that Christian civilization whose individual members act for cultural goals, while at the same time seeking communion with one another in a supra-cultural, divine, Goal. As Professor Gilson says, " the city of man cannot exalt itself, in the shadow of the Cross, except as a suburb of the City of God." [25]

D. *Characteristics of the Breakdown of Civilization*

As a cause of the harmony and unity of a growing civilization, there does exist some good, or group of goods, in which the aspirations and cultural joys of the active individual members agree. As a condition of the great discord and disunity into which the member-nations, classes and individuals of a civilization fall, in a time of troubles, there must exist a number of " goods " in which the cravings of the peoples do not agree. Somehow a dialectic of feelings, emotions and desires, which had proceeded from one historical challenge to another in a condition of relative harmony, takes a turn for the worse. Nations, classes and individuals create unusually poignant conflicts of purposes, mutually conflicting goals, some of which are contrary to the good of civilization. The condition which allows

[24] The breakdown of the Hindu Civilization, about A.D. 1175, was made possible by the discord and military conflicts into which the member states fell. *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, pp. 301, 237.

[25] E. Gilson, *Les Metamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu* (Paris, 1952), p. 291. *La cité des hommes ne peut s'élever, à l'ombre de la croix, que comme le faubourg de la Cité de Dieu.*

this breakdown to occur seems to have been, in the history of past civilizations, a widespread dissatisfaction with the *status quo*. If we consider the great amount of violence and conflict of all kinds that characterize history in any era, in the young culture as well as the old, the blunt fact that a young civilization may have encountered an historical vicissitude, a moral challenge, that was momentarily too great for it to overcome successfully is not surprising.[26] The history of a culture is so full of irrational and violent tides of events and diabolical occurrences that, in a time of conflict the unity of the civilization may be seriously impaired. If we seek to find the source of the breakdown of such a fallen commonwealth, we will of course find it before the event, that is, in the civilization while still in a state of growth. Briefly, then, past civilizations have stopped growing and begun to decline when the members of the general society started to strive for mutually conflicting political, social, domestic and personal "goods." There has been a widespread rejection of the civilizational order (because of some past failure of the culture to overcome an historical obstacle).

E. *Characteristics of the Decline of Civilizations*

But a description of the *breakdown* cannot suffice to show the source of the general decline (and fall) of a civilization. If we consider the breakdown of the society by itself, it is not truly a breakdown; it might, if considered alone, be only another great vicissitude in the course of a growing civilization. We need to consider (briefly) the typical course, during four centuries[27] that past civilizations have taken in their time of troubles. General motivations and "*goods*" will be revealed and thereby the study will be put within the purview of ethics. The whole historical process during the time of troubles may be described as one in which both the member societies and the social classes within the great commonwealth successively be-

[26] See note 21, and main text above.

[27] *A Study of History*, Vol. VI, p. 327; Vol. IX, pp. 289-291.

come acutely conscious of themselves and of their peculiar ideals. The state (whether city-state or nation) becomes an overwhelming ideal, a good unto itself; and the good of the state somewhat blinds the eyes of its enfranchised citizens to the good of the civilization. At first, there are aristocratic states, which exist with reference to ancient aristocracies of noble families and leaders of cults. The old order of the growing civilization prevails so strongly that the guidance of the state still emanates in many ways from the aristocratic classes. But as the "good," or ideal of the state becomes clearer and more attractive, the state becomes absolute; the ideal of the nation more and more outweighs the other traditions and sympathies. The absolute state, with an absolute ruler, in principle sets itself up as the opponent of the aristocratic state. The absolute state may, as it did in Greece in the era of the second *Tyrannis*, for the first time seek support in the unprivileged part of the nation. The "people" first emerges as a political entity. Usually, in its turn, the ideal of political absolutism has been replaced violently by revolutionary ideals antithetical to the old traditional orders. Englishmen evaded this catastrophe by replacing the ideal of absolute kingship, in 1688, with the ideal of class rule, hidden in the notion of a representational government. In such revolutionary times the dialectic of historical events and of ideals that began at the time of breakdown of the growing culture has progressed to a stage which differs remarkably from the somewhat religious and hierarchical order of the ancient epoch. What there is of that religious complex of traditions and ideals, which has not died or disappeared in Western Civilization, has been swept away by revolutionary violence in fallen civilizations. The unclassed, the "people" (the middle class), to whom the absolute state appealed for support against the old aristocratic orders, has become aware of its peculiar "goods," its Rights. Now it employs its strength for itself, and as a class opposes all the rooted institutions, the absolute state, the "crown," the aristocratic orders—all the representatives of symbolic tradition. At this stage in the history of a declining culture we may speak of the ascendency

of Pure Reason. " Goods " and ideals of many kinds are set up by an arrogant Reason which has purified itself of the beloved traditions of the old orders. Thus, in the Indic Civilization, the Sankhya (nirīsvára—the " godless ") philosophy was developed around the fifth century B. C., an era of general intellectual revolt and innovation in the Indic Time of Troubles. Why is the national life of states deprived of the exaltation of traditions and ideals which had worked symbolically and metaphorically in the religious minds of ancestors? We can note at least that the deprivation occurs by virtue partly of the very force of the new ideals of pure reason, and partly of the corrupting effects of social and military conflicts within an erstwhile ordered civilization. Old exultations pass away and old social symbols become incomprehensible, and they are replaced by tangible interests and by the cravings of revolutionary thinkers to see their conceptions actualized.

A second " rout " in the history of fallen civilizations begins to occur at this time, a relapse into violent wars and disorders. Since the time of breakdown, the ruling orders, aristocracies or " crowns," of *states*, have tended to ignore the exigencies of world order and foreign policies. And the new class, the " people," has been interested exclusively in securing their " rights." Such happened in Greece in the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. For Plato and Aristotle, *democracy* meant " mob rule " to a considerable degree. This new urban, " people's " class cannot really act properly in its own interests —that of " Man "—it lacks the guidance of any *positive* goal, whatsoever, that might be proper to its own interests. It has only the precarious and negative unity of being in the opposition. As for constructive goals, the interests of the various groups that comprise it pull all ways. All agree in wanting to be free from something. But the intellectuals want justice, the moneyed people want a free path to business success; others desire to obtain rest from the social troubles and to preserve old traditions. The fear in the " people's " class and its aversion from the more or less religious attitudes and social institutions of old are so deeply felt, that it is ready to rescue or acquire

its freedom by means of a dictatorship which acknowledges no rules. Accidental, political regimes begin to replace governments of high and unshakable traditions. A new element appears, exerting influence on the course of events, an " internal proletariat," to use Toynbee's term—an urban group of rootless persons, standing outside of all social linkages, containing an uprooted peasantry, an intelligentsia, a declassed nobility, ruined business men, unemployed and drifters. Their power far exceeds their number because they are always present in the cities, ready to form into mobs; they are devoid of any taste or desire for orderliness. In past civilizations the social order has become, at this stage, a kind of " Liberalism " which obtains a degree of social tranquillity, both from the ideals of a pure reason and the orderly requirements of a new and huge system of finance. This liberalism, propounding both the freedom of a critical reason and that of a new finance, seeks to make the state an instrument serving its purpose.

In this era, the center of gravity of political policy, already *de jure* transferred from the Crown to the people or their representatives, is passing *de facto* from the latter to unofficial groups and personages. Such happened in the Roman Commonwealth around 218 B. C. and subsequently, when the Equites, originally a select cavalry reserve corps, made themselves into financiers and later into a privileged class in political affairs. Chance and accident play a greater and greater role in the history of governments; old forms and institutions weaken in their hold on the sentiments of citizens; the negative unity of the " people," the unclassed, gives way to a positive disunity of aims, and the force of mob elements strengthens. In the degree that political order loses hold, possibilities open up for energetic individuals ambitious to have political power. The civilizational order begins to hang upon the accidents of unbridled personal regimes, the meteoric careers of obscure men who suddenly obtain supreme powers or suddenly lose them. A series of wars and social catastrophes now accompanies an accelerated demolition of old institutions. The time of troubles for the culture ends in extraordinary violence and disorder; the

civilization succumbs to the rule of a "Caesar" and to the dead peace of a universal state, such as that of the Roman Empire.

F. *The Social Goods that are not Good Enough*

When we consider this epitome of instability in the histories of fallen civilizations from their breakdown to their entrance into a universal state, we see how the historical process has been moved by the volitions of man. The goals and "goods" which succeeded one another have successively engaged the aspirations of national states, social classes and individuals. There are two outstanding conditions to be observed in the morphology of cultural decline: First, it has been an historical *movement,* a movement because the makers of history have been powerfully attracted by more or less great ideals and purposes. Second, it has been an historical *decline,* a decline because an order and a peace in the growing civilization has given way to a disorder within the civilization, within national states, in social classes, in families and in the souls of men. It is a great irony that the dynamic pursuit of ideals or perfections by the members of a civilization, whence occurs its historical movement, can compel and hasten its decline. For example, the pursuit of statism, of parochial self-interest by the member states of such fallen civilizations as the Hindu or Babylonic aggravated their times of troubles and hastened their declines. We are indeed witnessing irony in its most real sense: the irony of the good that is not good enough. The phenomenon is all the more ironic because the social evils, consequent upon the weakening of the goods, have multiplied tremendously in the decline of civilizations, in human eyes completely out of any proportion to their historical source.

We cannot ascribe the cause of the almost unbelievable catastrophes and slaughters that have occurred in declining cultures merely to the wickedness of man by any human calculations—any more than could the ancient Israelites have assigned the

cause of the plagues of locusts to themselves.[28] Here, it becomes a question of the divine Providence of God; for we can find no lesser cause of the tribulations that are visited upon the members of a civilization when once natural religion (at least) and humility that informed the growing culture have been cast off. It is from this point of view that we can comprehend the decline of civilizations.

No deliberate decisions have caused civilizations gradually to weaken. Instead, the citizens and the member societies of past commonwealths, at the point of breakdown of the growing culture, have abandoned the pursuit of at least a natural order and religion binding the whole society, and have sought particular aims. This historical dialectic occurs because of a gradual change in the conscience and awareness of the human participants during the culture's time of troubles. All the while that the culture pursues one political or cultural good after another, the conscience of the citizens of the civilization secretly corrupts.

III. The Source of the Regularity of "Historical Cycles"

A. *The Dehumanization of Cultures*

Up to the present, none of the civilizations that completely disappeared have been Christian. This remark extends to the Hellenic Civilization; St. Augustine wrote *De Civitate Dei* partly in order to show that the Roman Commonwealth fell because it had not been informed by the Faith and the Old and New Laws.[29] However, in the Hellenic culture and all others which have disappeared, some kind of religiousness has occurred during the vigorous years of the societies and manifested itself in various pagan rites and practices. Insofar as this natural religiousness has turned men's minds towards a justice which transcends human customs and vacillations, and inasmuch as it has given some knowledge and love of the divine

[28] Deuteronomy 28. cf. II Kings 24.
[29] *De Civitate Dei*, Bk. 4, Chap. 34; Bk. 22, Chap. 22.

Lord of the world, to that degree it has strengthened and stabilized civilizations in which those men lived. We can speak of a certain devout attitude that informed all past civilizations when they were young and vigorous, even though the religious sense was inadequate and unsatisfying in pagan societies.[30]

But in the most orderly portion of a civilization's life, that of youth and growth, the feelings, thoughts, plans and transactions of individual human beings are subject to interference from one another.[31] Nevertheless, during a civilization's time of growth there exists a rational order of human wills and intellects which is able to guide the tremendous energies of its citizens in such a reasonable way that we can describe this history as one of growth rather than decline. Such was the case with the Greeks, prior to the beginning of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War in 431 B. C. The Greeks had called themselves Hellenes. They recognized a common race and language and

[30] What is this religiousness of which I write? In defining the virtue of religion, St. Thomas Aquinas quotes Cicero in saying: "'religion consists in offering services and cermonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine'" (*op. cit.*, II-II, q. 80, a. 1, *sed contra*, quoting Cicero, *Rhetoric*, II, 53). The subject matter of religion is certain acts whereby God is worshipped, and it refers those acts to God as its end (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 81, a. 5, *corpus*). The interior acts of religion are devotion and prayer; and the exterior acts are adoration, sacrifice, oaths, adjurations and invocations. For St. Thomas the virtue of religion pertains to what is true in paganism and to the completion of it in the Catholic faith, worshipping God in the three Persons. Though Aquinas does not treat religion as a genus of which Christianity would be a species, yet he mentions the religion of the Jews "who offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind'" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 82, a. 1, *corpus*, quoting Exodus, 35 20, 21). It does not seem contrary to St. Thomas' intention that analogously as the New Law is the fulfillment of the Old Mosaic Law, so Christianity is the fulfillment of those pagan religions, past present and future, which Cicero's term includes. And just as it is possible for acts of superstition (the contrary of religion) to occur in a Christian in "offering divine worship in a manner it ought not," so likewise it is all the more possible in pagans "in offering divine worship to 'whom it ought not" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 92, a. 2, *corpus*). As to the kinds of superstition, worshipping in an undue mode, giving divine worship to a creature (idolatry), fortune-telling and magic, these are the very contrary of the acts of religion (*ibid.*, a. 2 ff). Consequently, when I mention the "religiousness" of some non-Christian civilization I am not referring to that religion insofar as it is an idolatry or a superstition but insofar as it has aspects, however sporadic and fragmentary, which constitute some genuine religiousness.

[31] Cf. *A Study of History*, Vol. IX, pp. 334 ff.

a common type of religion and culture over and against that of the barbarians and the Persians.[32]

The same multitudinous energies, once they escape a reasonable guidance, become possessed of a demonic force.[33] We noted, for example, that the Hellenic civilization underwent a series of catastrophic political and social wars after 431 B. C. Generally speaking, we observed that at the beginning of a time of troubles in a fallen civilization there begins a rigid dialectic of routs, rallies, and relapses, whose time intervals are amazingly regular. The rhythm manifests a process that flows from some source other than the voluntary decisions of men. And the eras of peace and creativity in this period mark, not the growth, but the decline of the civilization. When the order of a humble reason in the governance of the civilization begins to disappear, as disorder and unbalancing conflicts begin to increase, the quasi-instinctual inclinations of man take advantage of the partial relapse from their virtuous subservience to reason.

Within the civilization, anarchic and mob-like conditions begin to characterize the agreements and disagreements of the member national societies. These conditions make it possible for a very real dehumanization to permeate the collective wisdom that informs the civilization. It becomes pertinent in some degree to call the civilization (the terrestial "city of man") the "city of swine," because of the animal-like feelings, emotions, desires and complacencies that men have. And in the opportunity afforded by the continued history of cross-purposes of wills and judgments in the civilization, these appetencies take unto themselves whatever authority the human reason has neglected to assert.[34] And insofar as they have ruled, the human reason has been ruled by them; to that degree the reasonable "goods" of man have been replaced by the "goods" of emotions, desires, feelings and complacencies. And this topsy-turvy disorder present in the ends and volitions of men is, of course, a vicious state of affairs. It is particularly in those

[32] Cf. Herodotus, Bk. VIII, Chap. 144.
[33] Cf. *A Study of History*, Vol. IX, pp. 331-332.
[34] Cf. *ibid.*

cultural virtues which order men to the good of the *civilization* that the rule of reason and of right will is replaced by the rule of emotions and of sensory appetities, and, therefore, in which the moral virtues are replaced by the vices. For the civilizational goods and the corresponding virtues have in human history been the least known of the political and cultural imperatives that I think are incumbent upon the will of man. And it has been possible for men to live virtuously in their personal, domestic and civil or national affairs while being unconscious of their vices in respect to the civilization. As St. Augustine points out, it was possible for Roman leaders to sacrifice personal comfort in their service of the self-glorification of the Roman Empire above the other Hellenic states,[35] but the personal and political virtues of the Roman civil servants were belied by a vice which opposed the good of the Hellenic culture: pride, and one which we can term " cultural pride."

The significant fact, for our purposes, is the element of undeviating and cyclical necessity that then imposes itself upon the human affairs of the culture. Social transactions begin to revolve abnormally—and we shall see how—in exactly the same type of necessary cycles in which the animal, vegetable and mineral worlds revolve. Not only does the comparison between declining civilizations and sub-human spheres refer to the *occurrence* of cycles, but also the emergence of " laws " expressing exact time sequences. The advent of a " Caesar " and his universal state, midway through the process of cultural breakdown, does not prevent these " laws " from functioning. His bureaucratic dictatorship replaces the organic, internal and unifying agents and ideals of the civilization and the élan of its lesser national societies by an external agent holding an amalgamate together by force. From that time a psychology of the crowd (*foule*) more and more accurately characterizes the cultural and all the other moral acts of the members of the culture. To conclude, the order of the *civilization* is the first of all moral orders to suffer in the breakdown of a culture; it disappears the most completely in the downfall of the culture.

[35] *De Civitate Dei*, Preface.

Is there a lawful origin of the amazing *regularity* of historical vicissitudes in the histories of fallen civilizations which Toynbee has empirically observed? Cyclical "laws" themselves cannot be considered to be a part of human nature, for philosophical as well as theological reasons. Historical cycles are not an inherent law of the sociality of man, but an evil; for they manifest the destruction of the greatest work men are capable of building, a civilization.[36] Cycles are indeed a natural evil, though civilizations have been perverse in their idolatries, and though societies have been so sinful and rotten as to deserve extinction in the minds and wills of their citizens. For although God in His Providence puts all historical troubles and cultural declines to good uses, not the least of which has been to instruct mankind, still any civilization is a great natural good, and its destruction is a great natural evil.

B. *The Regularity of Historical Cycles*

I have dwelt upon these particular inhuman aspects of the decline of civilizations because, if we note the dehumanization of the cultural order, it will help us to understand historical cycles. The cyclical qualities of fallen civilizations have sometimes been likened to the biological growth, decline and death of living beings. But the evidence of history points towards a conclusion which can be stated in terms that are even less noble than those of the biologist. We saw that the *source* of cultural decline is associated with the losses of a natural religiousness (at least), of political sagacity, of virtue and sense of purpose. For example, at the time of breakdown of the Egyptiac Civilization after about 2400 B. C., law, political order and the religion were attacked by the people.[37] The Bolshevik rebellion of the Egyptiac people against the government of the pyramid builders was of a destructive nature. However, the question at present concerns the *regularity* which has been present in

[36] *Est enim civitas principalissima eorum quae humana ratione constitui possunt.* St. Thomas, *In Libros Politicorum Aristotelis* (Rome, 1951), *Prooemium S. Thomae*, nn. 7.

[37] *A Study of History*, Vol. IV, pp. 408-411.

historical cycles; for example, the span of 400 years, common to fallen civilizations, which has measured the turning of the wheel from the time of breakdown to the time of universal state. The answer, I think, is to be found in the rigid regularity that characterizes unthinking and necessitated natural activities in all levels of the merely physical world.

This physical *regularity* is imitated in the course of history, not exactly (1) because of the dehumanizing of human decisions, nor (2) because of the sins of men, but on account (3) of the material and physical condition in which man has been created. Man is not a pure soul or spirit, but an incarnate spirit, composed of flesh and blood as well and depending on the material conditions common to the entire physical universe for his earthly existence. Bearing in mind this condition of mankind, let us consider an analogy taken from the science of chemistry in order to understand the historical problem. So long as an external agent does not bring a purely chemical process to an abrupt halt or change the natures of the interacting substances, the chemical process can occur and reoccur with more or less exactly the same time sequences. The chemist can show us a beaker partly filled with a colorless solution; he can then measure a test-tube containing another colorless solution; pour one into the other and predict exactly how many hours, minutes or seconds will transpire before the mixture suddenly turns a brilliant scarlet color. And, of course, the experiment can be repeated many times, done with other containers, different quantities of the same solutions and carried out with variations in the dexterity and gestures of the performing chemist. What is more, if the experiment is repeated, there will be infinite new variety in the relations of all the billions and trillions of ions, atoms and molecules reacting with one another in trillions of reactions. And yet, in the immense complex of activities, the time interval is always the same, no matter how often the chemist may repeat the experiment—so long as he uses the same physical materials.

I think it is possible to argue from the chemical analogy to the temporal regularity of routs and rallies in the decline phase

of fallen civilizations. It will also throw light on the rhythms of challenges and responses that occur in a civilization when in a state of *growth*. And to mention the latter is to speak of our own Western Civilization if it is, as I believe, still healthy and vigorous.

Just as there are certain time lags involved in the travel of one ion or atom through the solution before it meets another to react with it, so in a civilization there are definite time lags involved in the communication of knowledges and emotions between the thousands or millions of individual persons belonging to the commonwealth. There are time intervals in the dialectic of images and fancies that develop in history from one generation to another, some of which successively enthrall and depress the souls of those who know them. There are likewise durations of time in the dialectic of emotions and quasi-instinctual actions that succeed one another or grow or decline in intensity from one era to another. Historians of philosophy have shown that there are dialectics of ideas or concepts that ravel or unravel themselves in years, decades and centuries. All these various timelags are rather independent of the reason and the free will of man. They are, on the contrary, caused by the physical and material condition of man. He exists in time because he is material, and the vast natural dialectic of emotions and instincts, of images and fancies, of concepts and ideals, follows upon his physical condition. All these acts of the appetitive and knowing powers of man, even those of his immortal spirit, are developed in time, transmitted in time and are reexperienced in time—that is, over a duration of time.

Given the concrete condition that follows upon human nature, these temporal dialectics articulate every historical activity of man. And it is here that we may find part of the reason why rather exact temporal "laws" of historical cycles have characterized the instability of fallen civilizations. This historical repetitiousness is similar to the temporal uniformity that occurs in the repeated experiment with chemical solutions. Some proximate end both in the chemical and the historical process is pursued by powers; by means of these powers the

reacting agents move towards the goal. And in both cases, in the historical and the chemical processes, the material conditions in which the powers operate impose a necessary duration of time upon the respective "histories." The *powers*, in the chemical reaction, are the physical potentialities of the chemical substances. The *powers* in the historical process of the civilization, are the appetites, both rational and sensory, of the human beings involved. But what is the proximate historical goal and "good" in the case of man? It surely is not the instability, that is, the catastrophes periodically occurring in the breakdown of a civilization, which correspond, in my analogy, to the terminus of the chemical process. These human and historical goals must be personal, domestic, political and cultural "goods" in order to motivate the historical process which man undertakes and undergoes. At the beginning of the cultural breakdown, these "goods" are less fragmentary, less unreasonable and less vicious than the "goods" which motivate the members of the civilization near the end of the breakdown.

C. *Freedom and Rhythms in Human History*

We can observe that even during the growth phase of civilizations, and in the most stable and peaceful [38] eras, there are conflicts, tensions, collective passions and *idées fixes* of many kinds. These occurred in Western Civilization in such "quiet" centuries as the thirteenth, and the eighteenth, if the culture in that later age was indeed still in a state of growth. For example, the Albigensian heresy arose in the thirteenth century in Provence, and the military power acquired in fighting previously the Holy Roman Empire and then the Albigensians greatly strengthened the French. By the end of the century (during the reign of Philip the Fair), the French asserted the

[38] *Peaceful* is taken in the sense indicated by St. Augustine's dictum: "the peace of all things is the tranquility of order" (*pax omnium rerum tranquillitas ordinis*) (*op. cit.*, Bk. XIX, Chap. 13). Though a civilization in its time of growth is subject to fierce internecine conflicts, nevertheless its "order" may be called "tranquil" in comparison to the extremely violent disorders that occur in a time of troubles.

secular national ideal against the international authority of the Church, to the great detriment of religion. In its turn, the eighteenth century Western Civilization was a revolutionary age, and the occurrence, in 1789, of the French Revolution, is a material symbol that is none too great to represent the turbulence of thought that preceded in the years before.[39]

Also, let us note again that the dialectic of knowledges, emotions, and desires follows its physically and materially conditioned sequence in an era of cultural growth as well as in an age of decline. *Rhythms* of historical events are present in a culture during its age of *growth*.[40] But such a society possesses some tranquility of order, a general peace which is governed by a more or less religious human reason and will. A relatively large degree of freedom on the part of the rational authority, therefore, is present in the civilization, and the course of events is proportionately independent of the instability, the cyclical " laws " that characterize animal, vegetable and mineral worlds and the world of man when it has been divested of the order of right reason. Empirical study has revealed no strictly regular rhythms of historical events in the stable periods of past civilizations.[41]

In this era the leaders of the order, or at least a somewhat religious unanimity of human purposes, have been able to place the dialectics of events under the mastery of man. The rhythms of one type of historical event or another have been lengthened or shortened, interrupted or broken at the behest of human purpose and authority.[42]

[39] Cf. P. Hazard, *European Thought in the Eighteenth Century,* trans. J. L. May (Yale, 1954), pp. 1-13.

[40] *A Study of History,* Vol. IX, pp. 291-295.

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] Historical cycles of civilizations have not occurred until the societies ceased growing and entered a time of troubles. Then we may speak of 400 year intervals and 3½ beats, measuring the cycle of decline and death. For example, the breakdown of the Sinic Civilization occurred in 634 B. C., when the Tsin and Ch'u powers collided in war. This was the first rout, to be followed by a first rally around the time of Confucius (551-479 B. C.), when the Sung government succeeded in making the Central Confederacy effective. The relapse, the *Chan-Kwo*—" the period of the contending states "—began about 403 B. C. No man caused the interval—that

But let us extend this analysis of freedom and rhythms to human beings in a morphology of heroic ages and humanistic [43] eras. Let us also refer to the complex historical sequence of all that is then physically communicable in man's material and temporal condition. The forces of emotions and ill-moderated desires, of disabling inertia and physical regularity imposed by the material conditions of mankind, do not at once gain the upper hand. They do not succeed in forcing the course of history into a cyclical pattern until the civilization ceases to grow and begins to decline. They necessitate only after the civilization definitely breaks down. Probably, not even at that time do they necessitate absolutely. If a breakdown of Western Civilization occurred in the sixteenth century, the decline of Western Civilization is not necessitated absolutely. Similarly, there is no social " law " in human nature which requires man to have business cycles of prosperities and depressions every fifty years. It is only when the free conscious will of man is frustrated that history becomes a confusion of contrary forces, resulting in a vector no one has consciously sought.

IV. The Nature of Philosophy of History

As I said above, we must ascribe the vicissitudes of history not exactly to the causality of man, but to the will of God and His Divine Providence of the historical events where the good was not good enough. Yet, one cannot understand the history

between the breakdown (634 B.C.) and the time of second rally, when the conquest of Ts'i by Ts'in established a universal state (221 B.C.)—to be about 400 years. The second relapse in the decline of the Sinic Civilization occurred when the dynasty of the Prior Han lost control for about 50 years preceding A.D. 9. This was followed by a second rally, the dynasty of Posterior Han in A.D. 25. The final relapse occurred in A.D. 172 when the Posterior Han and the Sinic Civilization itself, collapsed (*ibid.*, pp. 349 ff.). No man caused the interval of the universal state to be about 400 years (221 B.C.—A.D. 172). No human being caused the rhythm of decline to be 3½ beats. No individual sought the vicissitudes of the Sinic Civilization.

[43] The terms *heroic* and *humanistic* are based on Vico's periodization of national histories. Thus he speaks of " heroic times, in which the states were aristocratic " and of " human times in which free popular states or monarchies develop." *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, p. 314, nn. 950, and 951.

of civilizations unless one understands the social and political "goods" which have appealed to the nobler part of human nature during a time of troubles. From the viewpoint of philosophy of history, we do not have merely a problem of human virtues or vices and divine reward or retribution, but also a question of cultural and political goods which have proved inadequate. The philosophy of history, therefore, has here a double intent: first, an interest in the *cultural virtues* that order the individual conscience to the good of the civilization, and second, a concern with the nature of *civilization* itself and with the social and cultural goods that serve the general order. For the imperiousness with which various goods and ideals have drawn the souls of men during the course of civilizations indicates that these goods have a permanent place in the cultural order which human nature requires. If philosophy of history would order human conscience to the good of a civilization, it can expedite its task by anticipating, in its ideal of a human culture, the purposes and goals that sometimes attract the leaders of men.

In this sense, then, the philosophy of history is, at one and the same time, the philosophy of civilization or culture. Its ideal is the simultaneous presence of all the goods and perfections of a civilization at once. So long as we are thinking of truly human goods, such a notion does not seem to be self-contradictory; for, though the aims that succeed one another in the later history of a civilization seem to be mutually exclusive; yet, that is not really so, if they are truly goods. They have been mutually exclusive only in the sense that individual persons have been excessively and unwisely enamored of them. There does not seem to be an irreconcilable conflict between or among such ideals as the following: Domestic Economy and an Intricate and Beneficial System of Finance and Industry, Liberty and Authority, Equality and Justice, Fraternity and Rank, Urbanism and Ruralism, Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy, Nationalism and Internationalism, Pluralism and Unity, Reason and Faith, Humanism and Christianity, The City of Man and the City of God. Such general goods have

been the source of the movement of Western Civilization. In a time of growth the lesser goods have been sought in relation to the ultimate good. We noted that when societies and citizens have begun to pursue an ideal other than one perceived in at least a natural religion and humility, their perception weakens and their sense of values gradually disintegrates. But, on the other hand, an ignorance of *natural* higher aspirations inherent in man would jeopardize, if not individual virtue, at least the foundation of a culture. Nothing less is involved than for men to seek the simultaneous realization of all the true perfections that could be historically realized in the course of a civilization. It is what Vico called the total presence of man to himself,[44] or the total historical presence of a society to itself [45]—a reflective presence of many historical moments in one moment. For then the " goods that are not good enough," those ideals which we noted could not prevent the downfall of civilizations, might neither be over-emphasized nor neglected.

V. Summary and Conclusion

The stability of civilizations is a concern of moral philosophy, and particularly a part of ethics which I would term *historica*, the philosophy of history. First, the individual conscience needs to be oriented beyond the municipal or national or imperial good to the cultural good, and the culture cannot be subordinated to human politics. Second, such a doctrine can be called philosophy of history: incidentally, it clarifies the nature of historical science, it comprehends much in its historical outlook, suggests guiding values in the writing of history and makes the moral teachings of history the possession of the common man. The innumerable, minute and concrete preoccupations of historical science prevent the latter from performing the work of philosophy of history.

In a science of the stability of civilizations, an analysis of

[44] A. R. Capanigri, *Times and Idea, the Theory of History in Giambattista Vico* (London, 1953), p. 66.

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.

their instability (that is, of historical cycles) is in order. Historical cycles, those obvious phenomena of growth, decline and fall of many civilizations, manifest the instability of the general commonwealths which have disappeared. In the first period, a civilization is unified by various cultural bonds and outlooks, and this era may last an indeterminate number of centuries. But in the history of fallen civilization, a great motion of disunity amongst the member states institutes a time of decline, of international and intranational disturbances. The decline of these general societies is exactly a dehumanization of the individual persons and of the culture. The regressive movement of the whole commonwealth is instituted by a violent set-to of cross-purposes among each and every particular state and between lower and higher ideals of the cultural leaders. The group attitudes and collective decisions, particularly of the member polities of the culture, fall from the guidance of a humble reason. First on the plane of the civilization and later at narrower levels, the decisions and actions of men fall into a necessary sequence. The group of societies in the commonwealth begins to behave, at the level of the civilization, like a mob. In the divine Providence of history the slackening of rational guidance by cultural leaders has allowed civilizations to decline according to a " law " of historical cycles. And this " law " has no proper place in the world order, except to manifest the regularity in time that the uniformity of material things imposes on physical processes, and on spiritual processes when they have been subordinated to the animal and physical realms in man and his environment.

Ironically, man's pursuit of noble ideals, as well as spurious " goods," has brought about the breakdown of fallen cultures. For the very movement of civilized history, whether of stable growth or of unstable decline, issues from the tendencies and aspirations of the human spirit. An inordinate dissatisfaction for the *status quo* has removed the member states and peoples from the proper order of the culture, and once that order has been definitely lost the pursuit of " statism " has instituted a series of changing ideals. The leaders of the member groups and

societies crave in temporal succession a number of " goods " whose conflicting natures disrupt the civilizational and cultural unity. Disorder proceeds from within the civilization, within national states within social classes to a universal disorder in the souls of men.

Yet decline is not only a matter of cultural, political, domestic and personal virtues and vices, but also a subject of various *true* ideals or goods which the changing consciences of intellectuals discover during their culture's regress. (For, of course, in the very descent, the order of fallen civilizations has had tremendous momentum, sufficient to maintain civilizing processes and construct wonderful elaborations of political, social and economic structures). Philosophy of history, consequently, ought to consider divers goods and ideals that come to light during civilized history, as well as cultural virtues and vices. Man needs to seek the simultaneous accomplishment of all the true perfections that may be realized in the course of a civilization. Thus the philosophy of history, a Christian philosophy, seeks the stability of whole, integral culture through the cultural and theological virtues. Such a philosophy recalls: " Vain is the builder's toil, if the house is not of the Lord's building; vainly the guard keeps watch, if the city has not the Lord for its guardian "; [46] and reasserts: " Glorious is God in his saints, wonderful in majesty, marvellous in his doings." [47]

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[46] Psalm 126 : 1-2.
[47] Exodus 15 : 11.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN SCIENCE

IN referring to Christian Science, one may use advantageously an irritating literary device of the sixteenth century and call the system " a philosophical religion and a religious philosophy." Which of these it is preeminently it is almost impossible to say; while Scripture is one of the points of departure, Scripture must be interpreted only in the light of certain philosophical speculations of a rationalistic nature, speculations made first by Christ and then expressed cryptically in the New Testament, where they have been available for hundreds of years but understood for the first time by Mary Baker Glover Patterson Eddy of Bow, Massachusetts, United States of America, in the nineteenth century.

Christian Science and Mary Baker Eddy are no less inseparable than Christian Science and Christ. The *Bible* and *Science and Health* are treated as equals; they lie side by side in the Christian Science Reading Rooms.[1] In the standard Sunday services, passages from both books are read aloud. Moreover, there is within the church a rigid set of laws governing the writings of Mrs. Eddy to insure that they be preserved exactly as they were left by their author's last revision.[2] Mrs. Eddy

[1] A Reading Room functions as an " every-day " church, a species of oratory, where the faithful can come to read the passage from Scripture and *Science and Health* prescribed by the Christian Science organization for each day. The silence observed in the Reading Rooms has about it a church, rather than a library, quality.

[2] All her life after the first publication of *Science and Health* Mrs. Eddy was engaged sporadically in revising the text. This resulted in a large number of new editions, each of which made its predecessor obsolete. Consequently, every loyal Christian Scientist was expected to purchase a copy of each new revision as it came off the press.—Edwin F. Dakin, *Mrs. Eddy, the Biography of a Virginal Mind* (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1930), p. 292. Since the death of Mrs. Eddy, however, no changes have been made in the writings of the founder; in fact, extreme care is taken that these writings shall be preserved without alteration. In accordance with this policy, it was explained to the present writer in a Christian

had proclaimed personally in 1895 that there should no longer be pastors in her church, but *Science and Health* itself should be regarded as the pastor.[3] This place of eminence which *Science and Health* holds among Christian Scientists, its seeming equality with Scripture, is explicable in view of Mrs. Eddy's conviction that the work was divinely inspired and was even a kind of spiritual child begotten through Mrs. Eddy's communing with the deity, just as the spiritual Christ—not the physical Jesus, but the Divine Principle which was in Him—was the fruit of the first Mary's communing with the Holy Spirit.[4]

Science Reading Room that "we" do not copy Mrs. Eddy's writings, because "we" might inadvertently omit or change a word and thereby change the meaning of the text. Then "we" would be purporting to be giving Mrs. Eddy's words when actually "we" would not. Fortunately for the purpose of this paper, the Christian Scientists of St. Louis had donated to the public library copies of their official textbooks, and the public library has not undertaken to enforce the prohibition against copying.

[3] Article II, section 1, of the Church By-Laws reads as follows: "The Readers for the Mother Church shall be a man and a woman, one to read the BIBLE and one to read SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES." Section 2: "It shall be the duty of the First Readers to conduct the principal part of the Sunday services, and the Wednesday evening meetings." Section 4: "The First Readers in the Christian Science churches shall read the correlative texts in SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES: and the Second Readers shall read the BIBLE texts. The reading from the SCRIPTURES shall precede the readings from SCIENCE AND HEALTH. The Readers shall not read from copies or manuscripts, but from the books." Section 5: "The Readers of SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE SCRIPTURES, before commencing to read from this book, shall distinctly announce the full title of the book and give the author's name. . . ." Section 6: "These Readers . . . shall read understandingly and be well educated. They shall make no remarks explanatory of the LESSON SERMON at any time. . . . This By-Law applies to Readers in all the branch churches."—*Manual of the Mother Church.*

[4] Cf. Dakin, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-2, for excerpts from *The Christian Science Journal*, in which this idea is propounded. There are also indications that Mrs. Eddy regarded herself as "the woman" of the Apocalypse and *Science and Health* as "the child." Cf. *Science and Health*, "The Apocalypse." In the "Mother's Room" of the new First Church erected in Boston in 1894 there was a large window depicting "the four Marys—the mother of Jesus, Mary anointing the head of Jesus, Mary washing the feet of Jesus, Mary at the resurrection; and the woman spoken of in the Apocalypse . . ."—perhaps "Mary" Baker Eddy.—*Daily Inter-Organ*, Chicago, Dec. 31, 1894, quoted in *Pulpit and Press* (Boston: trustees of the will of Mary Baker Eddy), no date of publication, chapter entitled, "Clippings from Newspapers." With reference to the "Divine Principle," it may be noted that

The results of Mrs. Eddy's communings with the Divine Principle constitute an interesting philosophical " system," interesting to the professional philosopher, however, not as a serious explanation of reality or as a magnificently self-consistent rationalization, but rather as a curiosity or as an example of the seemingly everlasting vitality of idealism and its appeal to those who are desirous of easy solutions to the problems of intellectual error and moral and physical evil. Eddyism, as a philosophy, does consider the perennial questions of metaphysics, psychology, epistemology, and ethics. While the enunciations of the proposed answers is not free from inconsistencies, still a general, over-all position is quite evident throughout the numerous " official " publications of Christian Science. It is this general position which will be outlined here.

Just as any other philosophical system, Christian Science begins with a number of principles: God is; God is immaterial; God is intelligent; God is good. These principles have their origin partly in Mrs. Eddy's own personal experiences of their truth.[5] The fact that such principles could be made to yield

Mrs. Eddy entertained the notion that one who understands Christian Science also understands which words must be capitalized. Cf. Dakin, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[5] Cf. Fleta Campbell Springer, *According to the Flesh* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1930), Chapter 2. Also, *Retrospection and Introspection* (Boston: Christian Science Publishing Company), chapter entitled. " Voices not our Own," in which Mrs. Eddy recounts her mystical experiences: " For some twelve months, when I was about eight years old, I repeatedly heard a voice, calling me distinctly by name, three times, in an ascending scale. . . . One day, when my cousin, Mehitable Huntoon, was visiting us . . . the call came, so loud that Mehitable heard it. . . . That night, before going to rest, my mother read to me the Scriptural narrative of little Samuel, and bade me, when the voice called again, to reply as he did, 'Speak, Lord; for thy servant heareth.' The voice came; but I was afraid, and did not answer." Cf. *ibid.*, " Theological Reminiscence ": " At the age of twelve I was admitted to the Congregational (Trinitarian) Church. . . . In connection with this event, some circumstances are noteworthy. Before this step was taken, the doctrine of unconditional election, or predestination, greatly troubled me. . . . My father's relentless theology emphasized belief in a final judgment-day, in the danger of endless punishment, and in a Jehova merciless towards unbelievers. . . . My mother, as she bathed my burning temples, bade me lean on God's love. . . . I prayed; and a soft glow of ineffable joy came over me . . . the 'horrible decree' of predestination—as John Calvin rightly called his own tenet—forever lost its power over me."

desirable conclusions was also very likely an important factor. A further influence was Mrs. Eddy's association with Phineas P. Quimby, a nineteenth-century forerunner of contemporary psychosomatic practitioners; it was Quimby who, apparently, made Mrs. Eddy realize the possibility that all physiological effects had a mental cause.[6] She tells us that " in the latter part of 1866 I gained the scientific certainty that all causation was Mind, and every effect a mental phenomenon." [7] The fact that she was suddenly cured of the effects of an injury at this time appeared to her to be " the falling apple that led me to the discovery how to be well myself, and how to make others so." This was a miracle which the divine Spirit had wrought, " a miracle which later I found to be in perfect scientific accord with divine law." [8]

From the original principles of Christian Science, *if one interprets them in a univocal sense*, certain metaphysical conclusions follow as surely as night follows day: If God is, then whatever is not God is not; if all reality is God, then all reality is intelligent, or Mind; if God is all reality and good, then evil is nothing; if God is immaterial, then matter is non-existent.[9] This is the constantly recurring theme of the whole of Christian Science literature.[10] Although Mrs. Eddy's idealism is of a naïve character, the difficulties—or, at least, certain of them—inherent in her idealism have not escaped her attention: how does one avoid pantheism if all reality is God; how does one account for the individuality of human minds if God is all?

The first of these difficulties is solved with extraordinary ease

[6] See bibliographical notes.

[7] *Retrospection and Introspection*, " The Great Discovery."

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Science and Health*, " Science and Being ": " Divine metaphysics, as revealed to spiritual understanding, shows clearly that all is Mind, and that Mind is God, omnipotence, omipresence, omniscience." " Divine metaphysics explains away matter. Spirit is the only substance and consciousness recognized by divine Science. The material senses oppose this, but there are no material senses, for matter has no mind. In Spirit there is no matter, even as in Truth there is no error, and in good no evil. . . . Spirit, God, is infinite, all."

[10] An interesting current example of this is an editorial attempt in the *Christian Science Sentinel*, Feb. 20, 1950, to explain atomic power in terms of Spirit, Mind.

—for " pantheism " is taken to mean " the presence of mind in matter." In *No and Yes* we are told that Christian Science refutes pantheism, for Christian Science " finds spirit neither in matter nor in the modes of mortal mind " and " shows that matter and mortal mind have neither origin nor existence in the eternal Mind." [11] If pantheism, then, is taken to be some conjunction of Mind and matter, and if matter is non-existent, pantheism, of course, will be an impossibility.[12]

The second problem, that of the individuality of finite minds, or their relation to Mind, is more difficult of solution; the attempted answer bears some faint resemblance to that of Spinoza and involves the same implications of pantheism in the generally accepted sense of that term. Whatever it is that exists, it must be Mind, for matter and Mind are opposites: " One is contrary to the other in its very nature and essence; hence both cannot be real. If one is real, the other must be unreal." [13] There are, however, angels and men in the universe. Angels are " pure thoughts from God," God's representatives, " who guide men, not to a false belief in self, sin, or matter," but " with white fingers they point upward to a new and glorified trust, to higher ideals of life and its joys." [14] These angels, together with human minds, reflect and express the divine substance; God is seen in them as the sun is seen in the rays of light that go out from it, or as a form is seen in a mirror.[15] Quite obviously, then, finite minds are dependent upon the Divine Mind; the dependence, however, runs in the other direction, too. Finite minds are God's idea as well as His

[11] *No and Yes,* published together with *Rudimental Divine Science* (Boston: trustees under the will of Mary Baker Eddy), section entitled, " Is Christian Science Pantheistic? " What is meant by " mortal mind " will appear later in the treatment of Christian Science's philosophy of man.

[12] In *Christian Healing and Other Writings,* chapter, " Christian Science versus Pantheism," Mrs. Eddy says that " by admitting self-evident affirmations and then contradicting them, monotheism is lost and pantheism is found in scholastic theology."

[13] *Science and Health,* " Science of Being."

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.*

reflection; this implies that " if there ever was a moment when man did not express the divine perfection, then there was a moment when man did not express God, and consequently a time when Deity was unexpressed—that is, without entity." [16]

The same theme is reiterated in " Science of Being ": man is God's image or idea, the " infinite expression of Infinite Mind "; man is coexistent and coeternal with Mind; " spiritual man's consciousness and individuality are reflections of God," " emanations of Him." A single man, however, is not sufficient to express or reflect God's fulness; there must be many—perhaps an infinitude of—minds to express the infinity of God. Were this expression or reflection lacking, the All would lose its deific character and become less than God.[17]

Besides this mutual dependence of the divine and human minds, there seems to be an *identification;* for example: " The term *souls* or *spirits* is as improper as the term, *gods*. . . . There is no finite soul nor spirit. Soul or Spirit means only one Mind, and cannot be rendered in the plural." [18] " Spirit, the synonym of Mind, Soul, or God, is the only real substance." [19] And yet, " God is the parent Mind, and man is God's spiritual offspring." [20] The only real existents other than God are His eternal thoughts—angels and men—material " things " are the thoughts of " mortal mind " and unreal.[21] This, of course, is somewhat like having one's cake and eating it, too: God is the only true existent, the only Mind, and yet there are individual, existing minds other than God. Mrs. Eddy, however, has provided for the eventualtiy that those who read *Science and Health* should find contradictions in it; there are, she says, contradictions apparent only to those who fail to understand the propositions of Christian Science well enough to pass judgment on them—and the only practical evidence one can have

[16] *Ibid.*, " Recapitulation."

[17] *Ibid.*, " Science of Being," " planks " XXII-XXIII of the Christian Science platform.

[18] *Ibid.*, " Recapitulation."

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*, " Science of Being," " plank " XXIV.

[21] *Ibid.*, " plank " XXVII.

that he has attained a sufficient understanding is that he should heal the sick in accordance with the principles of Christian Science.[22]

There is in the Eddy conception of metaphysics something which has very likely never before been found in a philosophical system: a position on the "metaphysics of childbirth." This ontological obstetrical doctrine was taught by Mrs. Eddy in her Boston Metaphysical College, where "nothing about childbirth was taught except that the proper way to deliver a child was to make constant denial of everything, except the fact of the child itself."[23] Mrs. Eddy, as perhaps every teacher, whether of the metaphysics of childbirth or anything else, was plagued at one time by a student who knew more about the matter than she did. What, the student asked, is to be done in case of a breech presentation? The answer was another example of having things both ways at once: if the student is in Christian Science, there will be no breech presentation; but, if there is, one should call a regular practitioner.[24] The content of the course can be rather well surmised from the fact that the textbooks used in teaching metaphysical obstetrics were the *Bible* and *Science and Health*.[25]

In addition to the statement that man is God's idea or reflection or emanation or spiritual phenomenon, there is in the authorized literature of Eddyism a rather elaborate analysis of the nature of man, both as he is and as he will be once he has attained to the perfect practice of Christian Science. Man is not material at all; it is only the illusory man who appears to have flesh and blood. Because man has been made in the image and likeness of God, he could not be material: matter is unlike Spirit. Man's senses are merely "mortal beliefs," unreal, illusory; only mind is capable of perception and understanding. A scriptural quotation, "If I bear witness of myself, my witness

[22] *Science and Health*, "Some Objections Answered."

[23] Dakin, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

[24] Ernest Sutherland Bates, *Mary Baker Eddy, the Truth and the Tradition*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932), p. 258.

[25] Dakin, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

is not true," is one argument for the unreliability of the senses, for the physical senses themselves give the only pretended testimony that there can be such a thing as matter; the senses, however, are material themselves, and so the only evidence possible is the untrue evidence they give of themselves.[26] Moreover, man, who reflects God, cannot be dependent on material means for knowing or perceiving. The corporeal senses are the one and only source of evil and error. Material things are only as real as we make them, for what one sees or hears is only a mode of consciousness.[27] Will power, too, is a mere illusion; its blindness, stubbornness, and impetuosity make it impossible that it should really govern man; man is governed by Truth and Love, which are his motive powers.[28]

The real man, not the illusory " mortal man " or the unreal " mortal mind," which is erroneously supposed to be a " soul " existing in matter—the *real* man is coeternal with God and is in Him; consequently, man can no more relapse from perfection than God can cease to be the Divine Principle. Nor can man cease to be: those who " die in the Lord " will awake from a sense of death to a sense of life in Christ, " with a knowledge of Truth and Love beyond what they possessed before. . . . Those who reach this transition, called *death*, without having improved the lessons of this primary school of mortal existence, and still believe in matter's reality, pleasure, and pain,—are not ready to understand immortality. Hence they awake to another sphere of experience, and must pass through another probationary state." [29]

Just what it is that causes these " mortal beliefs " or these " errors " or this inability to reflect Truth clearly is never explained; nor is any account given of what it is or who it is that experiences these errors, other than the statement that it is " mortal mind." Mortal mind, however, has been cast out-

[26] *Unity of Good* (Boston: trustees under the will of Mary Baker Eddy), " There is No Matter."

[27] *Unity of Good*, " Seedtime and Harvest."

[28] *Science and Health*, " Recapitulation."

[29] *Unity of Good*, " Caution in Truth."

side the pale of reality; mortal mind itself is only a " mortal belief," an illusion. The only reality left to error, and so to man's body and senses, is that of being a non-existent delusion of an illusory source of deceit.

In view of the fact that man is wholly spiritual, his begetting is a wholly spiritual affair: " man is the offspring of Spirit. . . . His origin is not, like that of mortals, in brute instinct." [30] Once man has realized this truth, has understood that God is the Father of all, that man and the universe have evolved from Spirit, then there will be no more marriages, *human* generation will cease, and the real, spiritual man, already created, co-existent with God, will be spiritually discerned. This is the state to which Christ referred when He said man would neither marry nor be given in marriage.[31] Unfortunately, however, the world is not yet prepared to accept these truths.

Some of Mrs. Eddy's disciples, nevertheless, to the founder's great embarrassment, considered Divine Science sufficiently advanced to have certain instances of " agamogenesis." A Mrs. Laramine, one of Mrs. Eddy's closest followers, was reported to have said she knew of " three instances of pure mental conception among her students." [32] A certain Mrs. Woodbury announced that she herself had conceived virginally, and gave to her child the name, " Prince of Peace." This unusual " demonstration " of the truth of Christian Science lost some of its force when a Mrs. Rowe of Augusta, Maine, sued her husband for divorce on the ground that he was contributing all his earnings to the " Prince of Peace." As a consequence, Mrs. Woodbury was excommunicated forever, and the Prince of Peace was forcibly removed physically from the Christian Science Sunday school.[33] In understandable spite, Mrs. Woodbury then proceeded to publish an account of Mrs. Eddy's teaching on spiritual conception:

The substance of certain instructions given by Mrs. Eddy in private is as follows:

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[30] *Science and Health*, " Marriage."
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Bates, *op. cit.*, p. 365.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 366-7.

If Jesus was divinely conceived by the Holy Ghost, or Spirit, without a human father . . . then women may become mothers by a supreme effort of their own minds, or through the influence upon them of an Unholy Ghost, a malign spirit . . . she added the oracular declaration that it lay within her power to dissolve such motherhood by a wave of her celestial rod.[34]

As a final word on the nature of man in Christian Science, it might be well to mention that for Mrs. Eddy "man" is a generic term for all humanity. "Woman is the highest species of man."[35] While this is considered in some circles as a truth requiring no demonstration, it is difficult to see just how there is room in a complete idealism for a distinction of the sexes. Mrs. Eddy, however, does tell us that "the masculine mind reaches a higher tone through certain elements of the feminine, while the feminine mind gains courage and strength through masculine qualities."[36]

With respect to ethics, there is only one basic Christian Science principle: realize that sin is an illusion, that evil is the opposite of good and therefore unreal, a mere delusion of "mortal mind." Such a doctrine could, of course, result in quietistic self-extinction through inactivity or in absolute licentiousness; the Christian Scientist, however, must judge his progress in Science by his observance of the Decalogue. He must live a life that approaches the supreme Good; he must obey God, be of one Mind with all others, and love others as himself.[37]

Just as others who have adopted a kind of neo-Platonic emanationist theory, Mrs. Eddy was faced with the problem of how God could know evil and yet not be its cause. Her answer, though consistent with the rest of Christian Science, involves the simple expedient of denying any divine knowledge of evil. If God had any knowledge of sin, sickness, or death, these would of necessity be eternal, for the divine ideas are coëxistent with God; but only the real, *Spirit*, is eternal. Moreover, if God

[34] *Arena*, May, 1899, quoted in Bates, *op. cit.*, pp. 368-9.
[35] *Unity of Good*, "Credo."
[36] *Science and Health*, "Marriage."
[37] *Ibid.*, "Recapitulation."

foreknew evil, He would foreordain it, for " foreknowledge and foreordination must be one in an infinite Being. What Deity foreknows, Deity must foreordain; else He is not omnipotent, and, like ourselves, He foresees events which are contrary to His creative will, yet which He cannot avert." [38]

There appears to be in such an emanationist system no possibility of human freedom, except perhaps that of the Stoics: a realization that all is caused by God and a tranquil resignation to that causality. This, very likely, is the consequence of Mrs. Eddy's early religious training in the Congregationalist doctrine of absolute divine determination, plus her own rebellion against the disagreeable aspects of predestination. Even though Mrs. Eddy had ever entertained the notion of human independence of will, which of course she never did, almost certainly her hysterical temperment would have urged her to barter freedom for an assurance of salvation and a guarantee that all that is is God.

Christian Science has at least two practical applications, one pedagogical, the other psychological. In the realm of pedagogy, it serves the teacher of metaphysics as a superb example of the consequences to be expected from taking univocally such terms as " being," " real," " truth," and " good." Psychologically, it has undoubtedly been of great benefit to those whose physical disabilities have been the result of over-solicitude concerning health and to those whose emotional difficulties have resulted from fear, insecurity, and feelings of inadequacy. To the former, the conviction that the body is a mere delusion is a release from pathological concern for their physiological well-being; to the latter, the conviction that all is good, that evil is an illusion, that man is coëxistent with God and, in some sense, identical with Him—all this supplies the remedy for emotional trauma. Moreover, the Christian Science precepts of morality, neighborly charity, and toleration of those who make little or no progress in overcoming delusion—non-Christian Scientists—all serve to maintain an emotional balance which cannot be completely dis-

[38] *Unity of Good,* " Ways Higher than Our Ways."

counted despite its shaky metaphysical and religious foundations.

As has been the case with a number of deductive metaphysical systems, the founder of Eddyism came very near to deducing herself out of existence; it is this failure to explain what reality God's All-ness leaves to man that constitutes perhaps the chief difficulty in Christian Science, once the principles are granted. Secondly, there is the ever-recurring problem of how "mortal mind," which is itself non-existent, can be the source of all delusion, sin, error, and evil. Beyond these very general observations, only a line-by-line analysis of Mrs. Eddy's writings could present an adequate criticism.[39]

Certain somewhat amusing criticisms may be brought against Christian Scientists, however, on the basis of their failure to conform conduct to theory. First of all, the very existence of such a thing as a material copy of *Science and Health* is impossible in the system, and yet the delicate perfume of idealism is transmitted almost exclusively in these vulgar material vessels. Secondly, no one on the early board of the Boston First Church of Christ Scientist ever doubted the practical reality of the coin of the realm. Further, Christian Scientists have gone to great lengths in constructing bigger and better, non-existent material church edifices; moreover, in the "Mother's Room" of the Boston church a large part of the wall was covered with mirrors, to reflect, no doubt, the non-existent surroundings. This list could be extended indefinitely; however, what can be said of Christian Scientists on this count can be said almost equally of any idealism.

There is, nevertheless, one defection from the pure faith that is worthy of more extensive consideration: "malicious animal magnetism," referred to in early Christian Science circles as M. A. M., the term acquiring its abbreviation because of its frequent use. M. A. M. is the use of "mortal mind" to produce some deleterious effect on another human mind. Mrs. Eddy herself suffered frequently and even violently from the mali-

[39] George M. Searle, C. S. P., has written this sort of critique on *Science and Health* in *The Truth about Christian Science*, the Paulist Press, New York, 1916.

cious-animal-magnetic attacks of several of her enemies. On such occasions, students of the Boston Metaphysical College, or other close disciples, would be called in to counteract the baneful influences of M. A. M. by concentrating on the enemy and thinking him impotent to do any evil. Occasionally the students would take turns at guard duty; at other times they would gather, as many as thirty, in a circle and direct a massed mental counter-attack against the suspected "malpractitioner." [40] In *Science and Health* it is suggested that the courts of our land should take cognizance of such mental crimes; "Whoever uses his developed mental powers like an escaped felon to commit fresh atrocities as opportunity occurs is never safe. God will arrest him." In the Church Manual, Article VIII, section 6, the writer declares that it is the duty of every Christian Scientist to "defend himself daily against aggressive mental suggestion"; Article XI, section 7, states that members of the church shall be excommunicated if they "mentally or otherwise, persist in working against the interests of another member." Finally, Mrs. Eddy herself declared that Mr. Eddy's death was caused by "malicious mesmerism," by "mesmeric poison." [41] It would seem, then, that one's non-existent "mortal mind" is capable of causing delusion, not only in oneself, but also in others. How this can be remains one of the problems yet to be solved by Christian Science. However, in view of the rigid confinement of Christian Science thought to a re-conning of Mrs. Eddy's writings, without criticism or attempt at development, there is little likelihood that any solution will be offered in the future, to this or to any of the other difficulties left unsolved by Mrs. Eddy.

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[40] Dakin, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-5.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 227.

APPENDIX

The consistency with which dates of publication are disregarded by the Christian Science Publishing Society indicates a policy, though no reason for this practice is indicated. Such an omission, of course, especially in view of the numerous editions of much of Christian Science literature, makes it all but useless to refer to page numbers. For this reason, references are made to chapter headings instead. In most cases, the chapters are short enough that the passage indicated can be located without too much difficulty. A further difficulty is effected by Mrs. Eddy's penchant for rearranging chapters in succeeding editions of *Science and Health*. Cf. Bates, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-4, for a table showing the various chapter headings of the first, third, sixteenth, and last editions prepared by Mrs. Eddy.

With respect to *Science and Health*, it is at least very possible that Mrs. Eddy is not alone entitled to the dubious honor of authorship. Ernest Sutherland Bates, *op. cit.*, p. 267, quotes James Henry Wiggin concerning the part Wiggin played in preparing the famous work for publication: "I opened the package [the manuscript of *Science and Health*, which Mrs. Eddy had requested him to edit] and gave a scrutiny of the manuscript. Well, I was staggered! Of all the dissertations a literary helper ever inspected, I do not believe one ever was a treatise to surpass this. The misspelling, capitalization, and punctuation were dreadful, but those things were not the thing that feazed me. It was the thought and the general elemental arrangement of the work. There were statements that flatly and absolutely contradicted things that had preceded, and scattered all through were incorrect references to historical and philosophical matters. . . . I was convinced that the only way in which I could undertake the requested revision would be to begin absolutely at the first page and rewrite the whole thing."

Edwin Dakin's *Mrs. Eddy, the Biography of a Virginal Mind*, New York, Blue Ribbon Books, 1930, is probably the best, easily-obtainable work on the life of Mrs. Eddy. It is well-documented. A "Publisher's Note" in the 1930 edition indicates the difficulties involved in obtaining a factual biography rather than a piece of Christain Science propaganda: "The publication of this popular edition of *Mrs. Eddy* marks the failure of an organized Minority to accomplish the suppression of opinions not to its liking. . . . The book appeared on August 16, 1929. In the ensuing weeks it was reviewed by a score of men of character and of knowledge of the subject, outside the organized Minority, in complete confirmation of our opinion of its importance and fairness. This enthusiastic reception accorded by non-partisans was accompanied by so virulent a campaign for suppression that if the issue had been only a commercial one, it might well have seemed the part of practical wisdom to withdraw the book. . . . Many stores were forced by threats to renounce its sale, and many to conceal it." On this question of control of information about Mrs. Eddy and Christian Science, see Dakin, pp. 392 ff., where the work of the "Committee on Publication" is explained.

Dakin's biography contains an excellent bibliography and a useful index. *Mary Baker Eddy, the Truth and the Tradition*, by Ernest Sutherland Bates and John V. Dittemore, one-time director of the Mother Church in Boston and a relapsed Christian Scientist (New York, Alfred Knophf, 1932), contains an interesting list

of the students who were registered at the Boston Metaphysical College and a list of books found in Mrs. Eddy's library at the time of her death.

The most important source, however, for data on Mrs. Eddy's life is Georgine Milmine's *The Life of Mary Baker G. Eddy and the History of Christian Science,* New York, Doubleday Page, 1909. Miss Milmine headed a staff of investigators employed by *McClure's Magazine* in 1906 to scour New England to obtain sworn statements about Mrs. Eddy from those who had known her personally. The findings of the group, of which Willa Cather was a member, were published first in *McClure's* and then, with other material added, by Doubleday Page and Co. Dakin (*op. cit.,* bibliography) states that he has information, appearing to be accurate and authentic, that a friend of Christian Science bought the copyright of Miss Milmine's book and destroyed the plates from which it was printed. Consequently, the book is rare; copies, however, are available in the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, and the Boston Public Library.

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BOOK REVIEWS

An Historian's Approach to Religion. By Arnold Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956. Pp. 327 with index. $5.00.

Mr. Arnold Toynbee has an astonishing amount of information about a great many things. How much knowledge he has about these same things is disputed among authorities. As for wisdom that is something else again. However, few critics would be disposed to question his methodology which conforms to the accepted norms of historical research though the conclusions he reaches are often startling. Somewhow he manages to use a scholar's tools, in an unscholarly fashion at least, in *An Historian's Approach to Religion.*

The author has consulted a vast number of writers on subjects ranging from astrology to Zoroastrianism. He is familiar with the Old and New Testaments, with Buddhistic and Hindu texts, the Mahayanian bodhisattvas, the classical works (poetical and philosophical) of ancient Greece and Rome, the German, Italian and French philosophers of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and, of course, with contemporary theories on man and the universe. But with none of these is Mr. Toynbee completely satisfied. Nor has he given us his own convictions on these questions, perhaps because he has no convictions. It would be difficult to find a book that is so well written and so unsatisfactory.

In the first chapter Mr. Toynbee asks the question: "What is the nature of the Universe? a question," he adds, "that all historians ought to be trying to answer." It is certainly not the function of the historian to discuss the nature of the universe. This is the philosopher's field. Mr. Toynbee says the historian's point of view is one of his more recent acquisitions in relation to the historic era. But because of his preoccupation with a time-space dimension in connection with the historian's viewpoint, the author gets himself involved in a discussion that confuses him and consequently his reader, and this in spite of the apparent lucidity of his statements. For example, he has his historian viewing the Universe, which includes the stellar cosmos, at one moment and the next moment the Universe is considered as the earthly habitation of man.

According to Mr. Toynbee, "Man begins by worshipping Nature; when he ceases to worship Nature he is left with a spiritual vacuum which he is impelled to fill; and he is then confronted with the choice of substituting for the worship of Nature either a worship of himself or an approach to Absolute Reality through the worship of God or quest for Brahma or

Nirvana." This religious issue, he adds, was raised by the recent rise of the civilizations, and it has not yet been decided. "Man . . . having reached a stage in his history at which he is no longer willing to worship Nature because he fancies that he has subjugated her—has been torn between Man himself and God as the object of his worship, or between human power or happiness and Brahma-Nirvana as his spiritual objective. (p. 21) Mr. Toynbee concludes that in spite of Man's victory over non-Human Nature, the worship of Nature is still embedded in the living higher religions. "Its presence is evident," he says, "in current Hinduism; it is also seen in the Mahayana and in Christianity, e. g., in *the cult of the Mother of God* and in *the Sacrament of Bread and Wine*." (The italics are the present writer's.) The worship of Nature is to be found even in Islam, "which is the most rational of all the living Judaic higher religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and Islam is a match for Judaism itself in the severity of its monotheism and in the clearness of its apprehension of the transcendent aspect of God."

In reading this book two facts must be kept in mind, namely, Mr. Toynbee repudiates the Catholic doctrine of an infallible teaching authority in matters of faith and morals and denies that Christianity, as Catholics interpret it, is an exclusive depository of divine truth. His appreciation of Catholicism is conditioned by these facts.

In the volume under review the author gives us a book on comparative religion. At great length he describes the content of the Higher Religions of mankind. Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism—all come under his scrutiny, and although Mr. Toynbee is careful to point out in the preface that his object in writing this book is to ask questions, not to coin dogmas (the phrase is his own), he does ask many questions and he makes many affirmations which, if they are not dogmatic, come perilously close to being so. Yet he leaves the solution of the religious problem, which for him is the whole mystery of the Universe and man's place in it, to the future, urging us in the meantime to rely on the faith in which we believe. The choice of this faith he leaves to ourselves or to chance, ignoring divine Providence and asserting that we can believe in our own religion without having to feel that it is the sole repository of the truth. An infallible teaching authority, by which Catholics believe the depository of faith is protected, is ruled out.

There is no doubt about Arnold Toynbee's place among educators in the English speaking world. His ten volume work, *A Study of History*, established his reputation as a scholar and although critics have questioned his competence as an historian, none have denied his preeminence in English letters. In fact his literary style is so beguiling at times that the reader finds it difficult not to agree with Mr. Toynbee even when he is convinced that he is wrong.

According to an appraisal of his *Study of History* made by Thomas P. Neil of St. Louis University (*The Historical Bulletin*, vol. XXXIV, No. 3, March 1956), historiographers have both praised and blamed Toynbee. They have accused him, says Neil, of writing bad history, or of not writing history at all, of seeking refuge in religious mysticism, of trying to be a prophet, of writing theological poetry in prose, of imposing ill-conceived laws on the past, of being a positivist, a pseudo-scientist, a determinist, a poet relying on intuition. While no one would subscribe to this wholesale indictment, *An Historian's Approach to Religion* substantiates many of these accusations. He does write bad history. Mr. Toynbee says that he is not writing history; he is writing *about* history. Be that as it may, he writes bad, i. e., inaccurate history about Judaism and Christianity. And in the opinion of this reviewer Mr. Toynbee is a positivist and a determinist. If he were writing in the eighteenth century we should call him an encyclopedist.

To this reviewer one of the most surprising things in the book is Mr. Toynbee's unawareness of contradictory statements. True, he qualifies most of his statements in such a way as to make them appear to harmonize with whatever else he has said on the subject. And this wholly without guile. Mr. Toynbee simply does not see the inconsistency of his position. Or perhaps he is not inconsistent after all. If inconsistencies appear, the author says that he is merely setting down what he finds. He rejects the role of philosopher and at the same time modestly disclaims being a professional historian. Such self-appraisal makes it difficult to evaluate his work.

Although Toynbee insists that he is giving us an objective survey of religion, he draws a parallel between Browne's *Religio Medici* and his own work which he says might have been called *Religio Historici*. He denies any intention of giving his personal viewpoint but insists that he is giving the viewpoint of the Collective Human Intellect (sic!), which is the result of professional and personal experience. His own or the historians'? He does not say definitely. And it is this ambiguity that makes it difficult for his critics to pin him down. He regards with suspicion any philosophy of history, yet undertakes to interpret historical and religious data.

The keynote to his *Approach to Religion* is the Time-Space factor in history. " The human observer," he declares, " takes his bearings from the point in Space and moment in Time in which he finds himself and is bound to be self-centred." It is the historian's task to attempt to correct self-centredness, which, he says, is one of the intrinsic limitations and imperfections not merely of human life but of all life on the face of the Earth. He would have us believe that the initial self-centred standpoint " is natural to the historian as a living creature." (Mr. Toynbee's phrase) " Self-

centredness," he insists, " is evidently of the essence of Terrestrial Life; for every living creature self-centredness is one of the necessities of life." (Wherever capital letters are employed contrary to common usage the capitalization is Mr. Toynbee's.) Self-centredness the author declares is indispensable for the creature's existence! He admits that self-centredness is a sin, an intellectual error and a moral error. " No living creature," he says, " has the right to treat his fellow creatures, the Universe and God or Reality " (the two are identified in Mr. Toynbee's mind), " as if they existed simply to minister to one self-centred creature's demands." This he declares is the sin of *hybris* or inordinate pride which brought Lucifer to his fall in the Christian myth. " Self-centredness," he concludes, " is thus a necessity of life and at the same time a sin that entails *nemesis*." Clearly here, Mr. Toynbee is adumbrating the Christian doctrine of original sin. Later on he speaks of free will, though how he reconciles these truths with other statements, deterministic in tenor, is difficult to see. He does not attribute man's acquisitiveness to original sin but maintains that it is of the very essence of the human creature. St. Thomas Aquinas says the proper object of the will is the *general good* and to desire it is an absolute necessity. This results from the very nature of the will.

The historian's point of view which, according to Mr. Toynbee is opposed to self-centredness, is one of Mankind's recent acquisitions. " It was not accessible to Primitive Man because Primitive Man possessed no record of the past." Mr. Toynbee is here giving us an explanation of the origin of mankind which rules out divine revelation as a source of historical data. He does not deny that the Judaeo-Christian religion like other higher religions explains the origin of mankind through divine revelation which is embodied in Christian traditions. But for Mr. Toynbee this is just as true of Islam as it is of Christianity. His position seems to be that of the theist who, while admitting the existence of God, is committed to the doctrine of emergent determinism.

" It is evident," according to Mr. Toynbee, " that the Human Spirit is in fact in a position to break out of its self-centredness as soon as it interests itself in the lives of other people in other times and places for their own sakes." This is a far cry from the pragmatism of William James so popular a generation ago or from John Dewey's doctrine of the ultimate perfectibility of man and it is just as far from the Christian teaching on charity as a supernatural virtue. It is the point of view of one who subscribes to the doctrine of deterministic evolution, though I am quite sure Mr. Toynbee would not admit this. Admitting the influence of environment on an historian's point of view he says: ". . . each generation of historians in the Modern Age of Western history has been compelled to write its own history, of the Graeco-Roman Civilization. Each successive generation sees this identical period of past history in a new perspective." He says some-

thing similar to this in interpreting the phrase "Son of God" found in the Gospel narrative! Thus in Chapter 9, p. 130 he says in answer to the question, what is Truth?: "In what sense did Christians in those very early days before the statement of Christian belief began to be Hellenized mean that Jesus was the Son of God, that He rose from the dead, that He ascended into Heaven? Can we hold these beliefs in the original Christian meaning of them whatever this may appear to have been in our own world in our age? If we can and do hold these beliefs in a different meaning have we or have we not as much right to our meaning as the original Christians had to theirs?"

The author insists that he is giving us the accumulated evidence of historical research—his own and that of his fellow historians. What he is really doing is posing questions on religion that arise from diametrically opposed ideologies, supernaturalism and dialectical materialism with the hydrogen bomb at its command. It is his law of challenge and response.

How will civilization meet this challenge? This is the principal question in the book under review. He does not resolve it though he hazards some prophecies.

It is beyond the scope of this review to treat in detail the development of the author's theses through twenty chapters. Nor is this necessary if the reader remembers Mr. Toynbee's extraordinary ability to place the responsibility for his views on other's shoulders—historians, philosophers, religious leaders and even poets. And he makes it all sound so plausible. Perhaps because to him it is so.

Rejecting the cyclical theory of history made popular by Spengler, Mr. Toynbee points out that the modern means of communication and transportation having narrowed the limits of the world, a problem in human relations has arisen that resolves itself into his law of challenge and response, and he leaves the solution of the problem to the future.

It seems to this reviewer that Mr. Toynbee, recognizing the threat posed by technological developments, is urging mankind to rely more and more on religious faith. "If we have faith," he says, "we shall have no fear that it will fail to play its full part in helping human souls to enter into communion with the presence behind the phenomena and to bring themselves into harmony with the Absolute Reality." Is he a pantheist or an agnostic? It is difficult to say.

The missions of the higher religions are not competitive, they are complementary, the author declares. "We can believe in our own religion without having to feel that it is the sole repository of truth." The Catholic position is that the Church founded by Christ *is the sole repository of truth* and that this truth is protected by an infallible teaching authority.

It is obvious when discussing the Church as an institution that Mr. Toynbee is either ignorant of her teaching, which is hardly credible, or

he chooses to ignore it. The author is too good an historian to have ignored reliable Catholic authorities who readily admit the mistakes of ecclesiastical statesmen during the long period of Church history—yet he gives us a thoroughly Protestant point of view on this subject—and Mr. Toynbee is not, in this reviewer's opinion, a Protestant.

The distinctions between essentials and non-essentials in Christianity are clearly and definitively set down in Catholic theology. If Mr. Toynbee had consulted this source of information more frequently he would have written a different essay in Chapter 19. He confuses ecclesiastical policy and the reprehensible practice of ill-informed Catholics with sound theological doctrine. And he ignores the fact that even in matters theological, where the Church has made no definitive pronouncements, the "Roman Church" freely permits debate.

There is so much that is true in *An Historian's Approach to Religion* that one wonders how the author could have drawn so many erroneous conclusions from valid premises until he realizes that Mr. Toynbee is writing out of character. Whatever else he is—and the author leaves us somewhat confused on the point—Mr. Toynbee is neither a philosopher nor a theologian.

When Mr. Toynbee writes on any subject he does so out of an abundant store of information. In his own proper field his knowledge is encyclopedic. But whether he is writing about history, abstract mathematics, nuclear physics, psychiatry, politics or comparative religion he is always impressive. And because his writings are characterized by erudition rather than pedantry they can easily mislead the unwary.

An Historian's Approach to Religion will afford no little comfort to free-thinkers, to employ an outmoded but trenchant designation, and supply them, too, with abundant apologetic material. It is the opinion of the present writer that the book is safe enough in the hands of the properly equipped—and they should be reasonably instructed in philosophy, theology and Church history—otherwise it is dangerous reading for Catholics.

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The Life of Man with God. By THOMAS VERNER MOORE, Carthusian. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956. Pp. 416 with index. $3.95.

As the author states in the Introduction (p. ix): "This book is an attempt to lead the reader onward in the service of God by making him familiar with the spiritual life of man with God from its earliest beginnings

to perfect union of the soul with God." And in the Epilogue (p. 353): ". . . the all-important concept of this book . . . (is that) each and every human being is destined to be a friend of God."

"One consecrates oneself to God by accepting the will of God. The more perfectly, and completely, and without reservation of any kind we accept the divine will, the more perfect is our charity." (p. 216) The spiritual life of man with God is the life of charity. Charity, or friendship with God is never opposed to, but rather demands, the perfect fulfillment of one's duties in his state of life.

Charity is developed and persevered in by the consciousness of the omnipresence of God; by going to God through Christ, especially in the Mass and the Eucharist; by devotion to the Mother of God and her Rosary; by prayer, particularly mental and liturgical; by spiritual reading and retreats; by repentance and the practice of renuntiation and fraternal charity; by the elimination of fully deliberate venial sin, the conquest of semi-deliberate venial sin and imperfection; by emotional control in the development of the virtues. The gaining of indulgences has an important and official place in the work of satisfaction. The function of the spiritual director is of fundamental value, for ". . . one who trusts solely in his own judgment may go to injudicious extremes with the result that he gives up most of his good resolutions." (p. 356)

Visions, locutions, especially the significant substantial locutions, and other (extraordinary) mystic graces are well treated. That these are not necessary for sanctity, or full friendship with God, is clear from the insistence on the superiority of the theological virtues. Lukewarmness, wherein one falls away from his first charity, is a too frequent occurrence in the life of man with God. It is well described in its causes: habitual deliberate venial sin; falling victim to the contagion of bad example; so-called common sense; inordinate relaxations however lawful in themselves, etc.

The fundamentals of the end and means of man's life with God are certainly orthodox. The author's approach and development, however, are somewhat different. He uses the inductive method, perhaps too exclusively. The illustrations given are, for the most part, answers received from "collaborators" to a questionnaire in Appendix II. This questionnaire, a modification of Chautard's Scale of the Spiritual Life, seeks to determine which of its seven steps was the lowest, the highest, and the present one for each collaborator.

It does not seem that the illustrations would have suffered any loss of appeal, rather the contrary, had they been used to exemplify the application of principles, or of charity, to living. Whereas it is true that current examples of charity generally influence one more than historical accounts, still the insistence on the value of present-day illustrations because they are from ordinary people rather than saints seems over-emphasized. These

ordinary people are striving to be saints and sanctity, though perhaps only the minority really seek it, ever remains ordinary. Too, the value of the collaborators' accounts would have been increased had they been approved by the spiritual director of the individual involved. The author does not say they were or were not but it is evident some were not so approved.

In commenting upon these responses and in the general explanation of the issues involved the impression is sometimes given that the author's analogies, drawn from his expert knowledge of psychiatry, stress too much the similarity and not sufficiently the dissimilarity between abnormal and normal behavior. Encouragement might thus be given to the individual's proneness to excuse evil in himself. Analogies involving temptation, sin, anxiety, mental depression and elation seem to minimize personal responsibility for ignorance, malice and inordinate passion. Man's knowledge of the natural law and the ten commandments, his development of the virtues, their perfection by the gifts; the fruits and beatitudes as acts of the gift-perfected virtues, grace itself, and in particular the gift of wisdom perfecting the virtue of charity (since the life of man with God is, as the author rightly insists, a life of charity) should receive more prominent place in the life of man with God.

For example, in explaining the descent from baptismal innocence to the various depths of sinfulness this statement is made: " The answer, so far as it is given by our material," (inductive method) " is the lack of proper instruction in childhood and an inadequate home and either no living parents to care for the child or parents who had no appreciation of a spiritual life or were themselves in various ways morally inadequate." (p. 113) Referring, on the following page, to many outside the Church the author writes: " They sin, or rather, sometimes in an amoral manner commit sinful acts not knowing what they do. They are not really immoral." And as an example of this the following case is cited: ". . . I went against the natural light of reason and committed serious sin . . . I knew my acts were wrong . . . There was a stifling of remorse. . . ." At the very most the distinction would be between formal and material sin; better between distinct and confused advertence. But certainly the distinction is not between moral and amoral. There are no indifferent or amoral acts in the concrete order of human actions.

Also, the impression is given of an unreal distinction in theology, especially between the life of man with God in mystical theology and his life with God in the non-mystical sphere. The author calls these " The Two Ways." (Chapter XV) " And so we have before us now the two ways. Let us name them: the Way of Peace and the Way of Patience. Most devout souls living an interior life walk in the Way of Peace. But from time to time their Way of Peace leads them into the Way of Patience. . . . And patience hides a hidden peace. . . ." (pp. 305-306) True, peace or

patience may be the predominant element. But this would not mean two ways, for charity is peace, the tranquillity of order, of love rightly ordered. The beatitude of peace-makers is the act of gift-perfected charity. And patience is part of the cardinal virtue of fortitude which, to be a virtue at all, must be motivated by charity. So, since the life of man with God is a life of charity, why not just one way, the Way of Charity, with its three well-founded ages of purgation, illumination and union, each age being a development and culmination of the one preceding? True, there are extraordinary mystical graces which may or may not accompany sanctity or full-grown charity. True, the union of charity may be sensibly arid, even painful, or consoling. But unity comes from the end and in the life of man with God the end and way are one, namely, God who is Charity.

Since charity is perfected by the gift of wisdom and the fruit of wisdom is infused contemplation, one would like to see an explicit statement that infused contemplation is not an extraordinary mystical grace but rather the *normal* and summit culmination of charity. The book indicates that the prayer of quiet (a degree of infused contemplation) is found in most men who habitually conform completely to the will of God, and that many who do not attain it do not have this habitual and complete conformity. A life of charity, then, is man's preparation for infused contemplation, which ever remains God's gift.

The relation, however, among the following statements, for example, is not too clear. 1) "There are two roads to perfect union with God. . . . One goes on through steep, rough paths with little change in scenery. The other has many beautiful vistas that urge the traveler on to rapid ascent of the heights of perfection. These vistas are termed in this book the mystic graces." (p. ix) 2) "Our spiritual life commences with baptism. Baptism may also be termed the beginning of our mystical life with God." (p. 92) 3) "Under the term *mystic graces* are to be classified certain normal and fairly common experiences of some of those who lead a devout life. . . ." (p. 309) In a new paragraph on the following page the author continues: "One form of the mystic graces is . . . the prayer of quiet. The beginnings of this prayer take place so early in our spiritual life and are found so generally in devout souls, at least in its incipient forms, that we have given it special consideration in treating of the interior life. Outstanding among the various forms of the mystic graces are the prayer of union, ecstasy, interiorly spoken words." But which of the mystic graces are ordinary, normal for sanctity; which are not required for this same sanctity? This does make a difference both for the director and the directed.

Perhaps, the author solves this non-clarity by his distinction between the metaphysical essence of infused contemplation and its psychological characteristics or manifestations. The metaphysical essence "is something caused by the divine action on the soul through sanctifying grace . . ." but Infinite Wisdom and Almighty Power can perfect faith, hope and

charity—though ordinarily perfected by God's raising the soul to infused contemplation with its psychological manifestations—without granting the soul any quasi-perceptual realization of His presence or the glow of charity or a conscious burning yearning to be with Him in eternal life. This perception, glow and yearning are the psychological manifestations of infused contemplation. (cf. pp. 286-287)

Yet confusing, in the light of the above distinction, is such a statement as: "Perfect sanctity carries with it an abiding peace and consciousness of the Divine Presence and the glow of charity. . . ." (p. 266) This would seem to make the psychological manifestations of infused contemplation necessary for perfect sanctity, and then what happens to the author's Two Ways?

The third and fourth chapters consider cloistered contemplative life and its apostolic value. What is, perhaps, implied here would have been better stated. The apostolic life, cloistered or active, has its vital cause in contemplation. And sharing the fruits of one's contemplation in uncloistered apostolic work is better than contemplation alone.

Because this book is concerned with the life of man with God it is necessarily theological. It would seem, therefore, that more priority to the theological aspects; a more explicit, rather than implied statement, of the theological causes and effects; less insistence, except by way of explicitly indicated analogy, on the psychiatric side of some human activity; an adequate treatment of the virtues and all the gifts, of grace, and such elements as are found in the life of every man with God; more deduction from the principles of the spiritual life: these things would have removed possible obscurities (an obscurity does not mean denial) and made the work more valuable. The book is completed with a good index and a very good and well ordered appendix of references to spiritual literature.

There is no doubt that this book will do much good. Any one reading it thoughtfully cannot but be encouraged in his own spiritual life and drawn to its intensification by persevering effort. The exemplification of the difficulties, the progress, the generosity of men and women of all ages living in our day in all vocations of life and the subsequent rewards of the peace and joy from the greater generosity of God can and should give every man pause to ponder his life with God—or without God. A sincere placement of oneself on one of the steps of the scale of perfection given in Appendix II could work holy havoc in the life of any individual.

Whereas there are many possible ways of treating and stating man's spiritual life, the end or purpose is the same. Father Moore has chosen the inductive method and, drawing on his deservedly well-known fund of psychiatric knowledge and experience, has turned the light of truth from this science on man's life with God. The truths of theology and psychiatry, of course, cannot be in conflict. Father Moore is and has been among the

courageous pioneers in showing this absence of conflict in the practical order. The purpose, the end of man's spiritual life " each and every human being is destined to be a friend of God " the author accomplishes, and well.

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Logic and Nature. By MARIE COLLINS SWABEY. New York: New York University Press. 1955. Pp. 211, with index. $3.75.

Conceptual Thinking. By STEPHEN KÖRNER. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1955. Pp. 308 with index. $5.50.

Essays in Conceptual Analysis. Edited by ANTHONY FLEW. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1956. Pp. 274. $4.25.

Nature and Judgment. By JUSTUS BUCHLER. New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. 217 with index. $3.75.

An Introduction to Deductive Logic. By HUGUES LEBLANC. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1955. Pp. 256 with index. $4.75.

All of the above listed books were written by teachers of philosophy and three, it will be noted, were published by university presses. All are more or less in the field of logic, or at least of logic as conceived by the modern mind. This new appraisal of logic does bring all the books also into the areas of psychology and metaphysics. Finally, each book wrestles with the problem of semantics.

Of the five authors involved, Stephan Körner emerges as a superb philosophical craftsman; Marie Collins Swabey would seem to possess the most penetrating mind; Justus Buchler is the obscure member of the group; Anthony Flew is a judicious editor; and Hugues Leblanc knows how to write a textbook on symbolic logic. Körner tells the reader exactly what he intends to do and then does it. He obviously has worked on his book for years, has thought out every detail, and has the good sense to know that a summary at the end of a section can be a great help to the reader, and references to previous statements can make present claims sound more feasible. Professor Swabey is like Körner both in her clarity of expression and in the fact that both have a courtesy in their writing which makes one more sympathetic towards them than had they simply blasted their philosophical opponents without mercy. Actually, Marie Collins Swabey can be positively devastating in her criticism but she is always the lady, sensitive to the opinions of others and willing to hear opposite views.

Anthony Flew, a past master of the art, has collected another fine series

of essays, the majority of which were written in a polemic vein. For this publication the authors have softened their vocabulary but not to the point where the sharpness of their wit has been dulled. Of the five books, this one prepared by Flew is the most relaxing and entertaining. Each page, let alone chapter, has an air of expectancy about it. Unfortunately, like Buchler's *Nature and Judgment*, some of the problems discussed seem rather trivial. Unlike Buchler, however, these essays do not hide their meanings behind coined words or obscure language. Probably the quickest, if not the most just, way to describe Buchler is to call him a Whiteheadian Deweyite. Last, and also least philosophically, is Hugues Leblanc. When he is writing prose and not running off his code of symbols, he reads something like the barker for a sideshow at the county fair sounds. However, we can take more note of that later.

None of these books are by Aristotelians or even by out-and-out realists. Buchler and Leblanc have already been identified. Körner, Flew with his friends are conceptualists, and Marie Collins Swabey is a rationalist. The volumes produced by this latter group contain many realistic theses. In fact, Professor Swabey's book begins like the opening chapter of Aristotle's *Physics*. Her constant attempt is to read logical principles into reality instead of realizing, as in fact she must, that she discovered real principles in nature and that the logical and even metaphysical statement of those principles certainly is not reality itself. Conceptual thinking is also infected with the temptation to attribute more to the concept (which, of course, does not mean " concept " in the Aristotelian versions, but rather, as Körner puts it a concept is " any sign which in accordance with the rules governing its use can stand in entailment relations to other such signs . . ." p. 199 of *Conceptual Thinking*), than to the reality from which all propositions come.

In spite of these strictures, the books of Swabey, Flew, and Körner have many fine observations of philosophical value which merit both reading and attention. Yet, one gets the impression that all of these writers are better critics of philosophy than original thinkers. Whenever they offer something positive it is taken from another school of philosophy, usually their own or realism, but when they present something new it is usually rather second rate and certainly no great insight into the ancient problems of human thought.

Taking the books separately for a moment, we shall consider first of all *Logic and Nature*, which originally appeared in 1930. Passage of time, plus some revisions, have enhanced this book's value, especially when one realizes that the criticisms made almost thirty years ago are just as true today. Professor Swabey has two points to make: the first is that chance is not the essence of things, and the second is that reason is supreme. Surely Aristotelianism can go along with such a thesis and for the most part we

can accept the conclusions of the author as true. Unfortunately, Marie Swabey sets up a kind of conflict between reason and experience instead of seeing sense experience as the handmaid of the intellect. Further, she is handicapped by her implicit, and at times explicit (p. 39) desire to make truth univocal.

Besides some very observations helpful for understanding Einstein's theory of relativity, Professor Swabey is extremely valuable when she is on the attack. Naturalism, logical positivism, pragmaticism, to mention a few, are all subjected to some severe and telling criticisms. Many times in one gem of a sentence she brings into bold relief the weakness of a system as, for instance, when she gives the pragmatist's theory of truth in these words: " Human nature is conceived as a sensory-affective ideomotor system, its ideas arising as late intermediaries in the service of organic needs and tested by environmental consequences." (p. 116) Yet to the end, Professor Swabey continues her search for the logical principles which make nature what it is; she discloses them but leaves one more convinced of the validity of her opening chapter than the truth of her final conclusions.

Essays in Conceptual Analysis is good reading whether or not one agrees with a single thing the authors have to say. Peter Herbst states the purpose of the book neatly in his essay " The Nature of Facts " when he points out that all the contributors feel that " certain sorts of linguistic study are relevant to philosophy." (p. 134) As it turns out, all are so interested in language that one is left quite out in the cold as just how to speak philosophically.

If we take the last sentences from two successive essays, we may see the difficulty. P. F. Strawson closes his contribution with these words: " Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic." (p. 52) E. Daitz has these concluding words in his chapter entitled " The Picture Theory of Meaning ": " Sentences and facts cannot correspond in any way that suits the needs of a Correspondence Theory of Language." (p. 74) Nevertheless, in the process the authors do manage to clear away a great deal of nonsense from modern thinking such as the extreme position once held by Wittgenstein and the equally far-fetched Theory of Descriptions of Russell. Possibly the best essay of the book is that of Flew himself in one bearing the name " Philosophy and Language " and which turns out to be a rather good defense of Aristotle.

Next there is *Conceptual Thinking* which may prove to be the most important of the five books under review. It would be impossible to set forth here the doctrine of the author and that leaves us with the regrettable task of merely pointing out some weaknesses in the book. Before doing so, it would be well to remark that anyone seeking a truly scientific treatment of a conceptualist's mode of thought, Körner's volume is an ideal source book.

Aside from the epistemological unsoundness of the book, one must also object to Körner's impatience with words and definitions which have long been accepted and are still worthy of use. As a result of this attitude, Körner comes up with some clumsy explanations of topics treated with neatness and precision by Aristotle. Instead of using the notion of the Predicables, the author prefers five primitive relations among his so-called ostensive concepts: exclusion, exclusion-or-overlap, overlap, inclusion-or-overlap, inclusion. (p. 42) Of course, concept does not mean the universal for Körner but for all practical purposes they amount to the same thing. This awkwardness is characteristic of much that the author writes.

Later in the book, for instance, Körner eliminated truth and falseness on the grounds that no one definition is acceptable to all. In their place he offers appropriate and inappropriate. (chap. viii) Likewise he finds trouble with the principle of contradiction (p. 75) and so dismisses it, although in practice, of course, he continues to use it. (e.g., p. 131) The simple logical device of the extension and comprehension of a word would have made his treatment of the hierarchies of ostensive concepts so much simpler (chap. xvii), but as it turns out, the book becomes more and more complex. However, Körner is not obscure. A gloss of terms would make it easier for the reader but even without such an aid, it is possible to follow Körner's line of reasoning and objective. There are some notable contributions to philosophy in this volume, yet one wishes that the author had been less casual with traditional modes of expression and more restrained in his own terminology. Had he done so, he might have produced a truly great work.

In *Nature and Judgment*, Justus Buchler follows the same road of original vocabulary as that used by Körner. It is his own vocabulary and leaves one with the sad impression that in order to read modern philosophy today one must learn several dialects of English. The first half of this book, concerned with "judgment" and "query," reads like the minutes taken at a cocktail party gathering of philosophers at which all sound very profound but say nothing other than the obvious.

Regardless of the shortcomings of *Nature and Judgment*, its author does see the contemporary philosophical problem. As early as page nine he sums up what has become pretty much the interest of recent philosophical thought. He writes: "The sign-studies of Peirce, Royce, and Mead, together with the powerful work of Dewey, have done much to invigorate the study of human utterance by suggesting the centrality of communication. A host of mid-twentieth century 'linguistic'-minded writers, in pursuit of 'analysis' and 'clarity,' have returned to the particularistic philosophizing of the lesser medievals and have interrupted the study of foundational questions." The subtitle of Körner's *Conceptual Thinking* is "A Logical Inquiry" and then there is Flew's collection of essays which includes the word "analysis" in its title. Symbolic logic is part of the trend,

as Leblanc well knows. Only Professor Swabey seems left out, but she is one who knows the climate of modern thought and wants to change it, although she would no doubt admit that there is something healthy in it since men are again examining methods of approach to all problems.

In the end Buchler gets lost in the infinite, and that is a weakness of the contemporary thinker. With Whitehead, he wants to explain every possible influence of any one act. Man is trying to attain divine knowledge which does know each thing down to its infinitesimal detail. Symbolic logic is striving to achieve the language of this infinite. It is true that man desires to know all things but intellectual knowledge is not a knowledge of the particular as such but a search for causes which are universal. Some of the writers under consideration in this review are keenly aware of the fact that such knowledge of detail is not available to man and even not useful to him.

Marie Collins Swabey attacks this obsession with the infinite several times in her book and especially points out weaknesses in the thought of Russell and the whole structure of mathematical logic. Körner does not spare Russell either and, perhaps more fundamentally, calls into question the presuppositions of Boolean algebra itself. Finally, in Flew's collection there are more frontal attacks on symbolic logic and the quest for the infinite.

All of this must be news to Hugues Leblanc who approaches symbolic logic as though she were still the gay debutante of Russell-Whitehead days. Her entrance into philosophical society certainly did create a great stir but the passage of time has done what it always does to the debutante. It has replaced her with a new one and now symbolic logic does not seem so ravishingly exciting.

The very title, *An Introduction to Deductive Logic,* is enough to make most logicians of the classical logic annoyed. By implication, one takes it that this is *the* logic of deduction and Leblanc apparently thinks so, as he treats the Aristotelian logic as something from which a little can be salvaged but nothing much beyond the categorical syllogism. (p. 17) Without any explanation he informs the reader that traditional philosophy had assigned mathematics a mythical subject named quantity (p. 6) and later he finds fault with the Square of Opposition, (p. 66) but mainly because he misunderstands it himself.

Nevertheless, as a textbook for mathematical logic, this volume ranks with the classic one by Quine. Indeed, Professor Quine directed Leblanc at Harvard. Without doubt, the book will further knowledge of this subject but one doubts seriously that it will further progress in thought. Symbolic logic is no substitute for Aristotelian logic, let alone a complete and coherent system of philosophy itself. In his Preface, Leblanc tells us that his book is intended for advanced undergraduates, but he does not tell us in what they are advanced; and also it is meant for elementary

graduate work in logic. Besides a very fine selected bibliography on symbolic logic at the end of the book, there are also pages of excellent exercises for the student.

Finally on this subject we should point out that some mathematical logicians do not claim to be philosophers and most philosophers will admit that they are not mathematical logicians. The fact is that mathematical logic has not swept anyone off his feet other than the members of the symbolic logic fraternity. By this we do not want to dismiss symbolic logic, but its claims to greater exactness are simply not borne out and its philosophical foundations are open to serious question.

By way of summary, we might say that these five volumes at least indicate that the English speaking philosophical world is not asleep. The modern philosopher in America, England, and Australia is facing the problems of men, seeking solutions, defending old and new positions, abandoning false systems, and abreast with much of the thinking in the non-English speaking world. Hence, to all these authors and for all these books, any criticisms not withstanding, a warm word of congratulations is in order.

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Ethical Value. By GEORGE F. HOURANI. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan University Press, 1956. Pp. 233. $4.50.

Dr. Hourani's designation of "value" is in terms of satisfaction, and he believes that it is not possible to substitute for satisfaction some such ideas as pleasure or happiness. Perhaps closer to his designation would be "fulfillment of desire." But he would not allow us to say that value or good—he does not sharply distinguish between them—is the desire-fulfilling aspect of things. The satisfaction of which he speaks is a characteristic of the subject rather than of the object. He sums things up (pp. 118-9): "It was maintained in previous chapters that the goodness of experience is one thing—actual satisfaction; that that of things is another—potential satisfaction; and that moral goodness is again different, consisting of a will to produce good experiences and things." Good is said to be analysable in terms of satisfaction, and right, as the best or top good, in terms of good.

As for the ethical good, this likewise is put in terms of satisfaction. An act is said to be good "in the event," if and so far as it "creates more satisfaction than dissatisfaction on the whole, including its own intrinsic satisfactoriness as well as that of its consequences, and distributes this

satisfaction between persons with some degree of justice." No doubt this statement is difficult, not merely because the sentence is long and a trifle complicated, but because we have to appeal to the immediate in order to know what "satisfaction" and "dissatisfaction" are and to suppose the terms stand for something known in the same way by all men. Then, too, it concludes with "justice," which we must suppose has to be delimited in terms of "good."

At several places we find ourselves asking whether Dr. Hourani's definings are enlightening and useful. They do not evidently make headway. For instance, he says (p. 100): "It would be roughly true to say that an action is 'morally good' in proportion as the act is done from a good will, and that a good will is one which wills an act which it thinks good 'in the event.'" Now aside from the fact that a will does not think at all, we seem to have gone around in a pointless circle. The author several times does this; he never apologizes for it and seems to be unaware of a circular statement's futility.

It is easy to see that the author is considerably under the influence of Kant, both in doctrine and in language. He is even more under the influence of the British "empirical" school of moral philosophers, and has made a rather complete coverage of G. E. Moore, Ross, Broad, and Ewing. Besides, he is frank in saying from the start that his chief interest is terminology. As he says, his is a study in "linguistic behavior." In short, he studies words.

We fail, for our part, to be overpowered by the "empirical" and factual study—of good and evil, or emotions, or matter or peace or the person—if an author's main lead is a word or any body of words. Here lies the author's chief difficulty and shortcoming: the relations between words and concepts and things. He assumes that if he picks up and threshes out the way people use words such as "value," "good" and "right," he is making an empirical study of value and good and right. Perhaps he is. Perhaps these "things" primarily are words; but this is a point to be shown and not assumed.

It is easy in any case to disagree with Dr. Hourani's observing of the manner in which people do use the word *good*. I, on my part, seem to observe them using it in this way: "Don't do that—it is bad for you. Don't eat that—it is poison. Here, take this instead: it is good for you, or take this: it is yet better." They are using the idea "good," we would say, exactly as Aristotle uses it when he says, regarding a then recent theory of ownership, that far from building up the state, it would tear it down: "and surely that which is the destruction of the city cannot be the good of the city."

In other words, Aristotle is saying—and we seem to be seeing people mean—that the "to be" (*esse*) of the state, or of this state, or of this

man, is in some radical way the good of the state or of this state or of this man, and that that which helps a thing to be is an instrumental good for it and that which deflates its being or even destroys it is bad for it.

So it seems to us that an approach from the way people use the words "good" and "evil," does not obviously give a designation in terms of satisfaction, but more radically in terms of being and not-being. Of course, Aristotle's treatment of "good" in the first place may be looked on as an outgrowth of his biological studies. But that perhaps is not a bad place to begin a study of "good" in and for the living world and in and for man, and we believe it readily possible to extend his designation to all types of real beings.

In other words, it seems to us that Dr. Hourani's approach to the study of "linguistic behavior" is not based on close observation. We maintain that such an approach is not a sound one in any case. A much more serviceable and empirical approach is by observing that things such as men and ants and trees and stones are, and that at least some of them "desire to be," each in its own kind of being. As Aquinas puts it, "Everything desires to be (*esse*) in its own type of being." Or as he says elsewhere, each thing resists disintegration. An empirical study might show such to be generally, if perhaps not universally, the case. Then we might care to go on and keep saying that everything, or nearly everything, desires to be and resists disintegration. We could merely keep saying this entire awkward lot of words. But people have found it convenient to use "good" as a sort of shorthand for something in the whole observed empirical situation.

We take them to be saying that what goes with their being is good for them, and to be assuming—it is a nice compliment to the intrinsic good—that their being is in some sense their good. It may be that they desire their being when and insofar as they lack it, and "rest in" it insofar as they possess it. In that sense, it might be possible to find that a translation of their acts, even more than of their words, would read "good" in terms of satisfaction.

An empirical tradition that primarily studies words is the thinnest of empirical traditions. Word behavior and linguistic gymnastics is the least of all studies, so far as philosophy is concerned. We must think that, in the study of values and ethics, it inbreeds quickly—which may be a good thing. And just at this time when people are looking for foundations, for something on which to build justice and peace and the good of human survival itself, and are turning from current intellectual blind alleys toward a natural-law basis, nothing could seem to be more antedated than a study of value and ethical value based on words.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Contemporary Philosophy—Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism. By the Rev. Frederick Copleston, S. J. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1956. Pp. 239. $4.00.

The sub-title of this book is more accurately descriptive of the contents than is the title. As that sub-title suggests, the book is divided into two parts. The first contains seven rather disjointed studies of specific aspects of logical positivism. These essays are, for the most part, papers read on various occasions, or articles published in various magazines; hence the lack of any very strict unity. One misses particularly any straightforward exposition of what logical positivism is, after the manner of Feiglo's classic exposition, with the result that one has the sense throughout the first of the book of being immersed in tangential studies. This is regrettable because it was Fr. Copleston who called attention, in the last chapter of his *Aquinas* (Penguin), to the need for Thomists to familiarize themselves with the analytic philosophy, including logical positivism. Yet this first section is not without value. Chapter II ("Some Reflections on Logical Positivism") is a model of informed and urbane critical evaluation of a vigorous contemporary philosophy, and Chapter VII ("The Meaning of the Terms Predicated of God") offers a distinction between objective and subjective meaning which makes sense to contemporary intellects of the medieval distinction between divine perfections considered in themselves and the human mode of experiencing (analogically) those perfections.

The second part of the book opens with a chapter on Continental personalism (Mounier, Lavelle, Le Senne), and proceeds to a four-chapter exposition of existentialism. This latter is done according to a now standard pattern: an introductory chapter on the themes of existentialism, a chapter on theistic existentialism (Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Marcel), a chapter on atheistic existentialism (Heidegger and Sartre), a concluding critical chapter. The pattern is standard, but the performance is brilliant. What is particularly notable about the concluding chapter is that in it existentialism and analysis confront each other in an intellect basically Thomist. This, I suggest, is significant Thomism.

As is well-known, Father Copleston has already published a three-volume history of philosophy embracing the pre-Socratics through Suarez. The outstanding merits of that history are the objectivity of its spirit and the humane tone of its scholarship. Father Copleston never fails to do intellectual justice to any position, but he never loses his own center, either.

One hopes that the present volume is part of the raw material of an eventual volume devoted to the history of contemporary philosophy in the same series.

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El Evolucionismo en Filosofía y Teología. JUAN FLORS, Editor. Barcelona, 1956. Pp. 260.

This work comprises the papers presented at the Congress of Ecclesiastical Sciences, organized by the Pontifical University of Salamanca on the occasion of the Seventh Centenary of its foundation. The section on philosophy and theology has as the central theme of its studies "Evolutionism in Philosophy and Theology": a theme, indeed, of great interest, in the discussion of which some of the most distinguished authorities of the scientific world on this matter, are here collaborating.

Evolutionism has become one of the most absorbing problems in modern times. It is true that the question of man's appearance on the earth had been discussed in the past century. But then it scarcely interested theologians and philosophers. Its study was limited to the fields of natural and exegetical sciences. Today theologians and philosophers also have had to face the problem, spurred by the Encyclical Letter "*Humani Generis,*" which not only marked the path, but also stimulated them to an attentive and profound study of the question.

The Congress at Salamanca limited itself to studying anthropological evolutionism, since it offers more difficulties and broader perspectives. For this reason the collaboration of experts in the diverse sciences which have a bearing on the evolutionistic doctrine has been necessary: biblical exegesis, theology and philosophy on the one hand; biology, comparative morphology and paleontology, on the other. The material in this volume is arranged accordingly.

The following papers were presented: Present Situation and Sense of the Problem of Evolutionism, by Fr. Augusto Andres Ortega, C. M. F.; Evolutionism in the Light of Philosophical Principles, by Fr. Charles Boyer, S. J.; Evolutionism and the Latest Data of Paleontology, by Pietro Leonardi; Time and Evolution, by Salvador Peris Torres; Evolutionism and Comparative Morphology of the Nervous System, by Fr. Emmanuel Ubeda, O. P.; Evolutionism in the Account of Genesis, by Fr. Luis Arnaldich, O. F. M.; Evolutionism in the Fathers, by Dr. Eugenio Gonzalez; Evolutionism, Monogenism, and Original Sin, by Fr. Emmanuel Cuervo, O. P.; Evolutionism and the Distinction between the Natural and Supernatural

Orders, by Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O. P.; Anthropological Evolutionism and the Magisterium of the Church, by Fr. José A. Aldama, S. J.

Although the prophecies of the founders of evolutionism have not been fulfilled, we must admit that transformistic doctrines have achieved a vital resurgence. It can be stated that in general the scientists of our day are in some way transformists. Yet, however advanced the situation of evolutionism be considered, we cannot fail to notice the want of concrete data, which can be forwarded only by the natural sciences. As long as the creative action of God in the world, and the radical difference between spirit and matter are maintained, the problem of evolutionism is no longer religious or philosophical, but only scientific—that is, it must be solved by scientific methods. From this point of view the attitude of the theologian or the philosopher in reference to evolutionism would be one of complete serenity and indifference. Neither the principles of faith nor the postulates of reason are opposed to an evolution thus understood.

Progess in the study of evolutionism depends almost exclusively on paleontology. It is its function to offer the documents to prove the "morphological continuity" which the precursors of evolutionism found —to their astonishment—when classifying living beings. After a detailed study of the data produced by paleontology either *pro* or *contra* the evolutionistic hypothesis, Professor Leonardi concludes that much is wanting in order to solve the question. Nevertheless, the facts that have been proved so far, are sufficient to show the reality of the phenomenon of a "limited" evolution not opposed to a well-interpreted creationism.

The doctrine of evolution is intimately linked to the origin of man as told in Genesis. Fr. Arnoldich in his study on this point has tried to concretize the literal sense intended by the inspired author when writing about the origin of Adam and Eve. His conclusions may be summarized in the following points: a) In the texts concerning the origin of Adam and Eve the sacred author merely affirms the fact of their creation, in which God intervened in a special way; b) The circumstances of the mode of the creation of both enter into the mind of the hagiographer as literary means of expression independent of an objective historical reality; c) The nature of the matter on which God operated in the creation of Adam and Eve is not specified; d) Throughout the narrative the unity of the human species is presupposed. This interpretation of the text in Genesis closes the door to all integral and transformist materialism, but not to the possibility of a well-understood creationist transformism.

From a theological point of view the evolutionistic doctrine touches—nay, it can easily compromise—revealed truths. There is no doubt that it implies principles of faith as fundamental as the existence of God, creation "*ex nihilo*," the difference between the natural and supernatural orders, monogenism and the transmission of original sin. The ecclesiastical magisterium has had to intervene on several occasions: condemning at times,

marking the bounds of action at others, but always counseling prudence and caution in so delicate a matter as this.

In this work problems are discussed and explained extensively by competent experts. Undoubtedly the studious mind will find in there pages a safe orientation in reference to revelation and a compilation of concrete data and working hypotheses provided by the profane sciences.

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The Mind of Santayana. By RICHARD BUTLER, O.P. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955. Pp. 233 with index. $4.00.

Very few critics of the works of a particular philosopher have had the privilege accorded to Fr. Butler. He studied Santayana's philosophy through the mouth of Santayana himself. For two years, almost to the day of Santayana's death, he conversed weekly with the noted author, and learned at first hand the full matured views of this unusual man. For instance, he records that Santayana advised him not to use the five-volume work, *The Life of Reason,* which is generally considered his greatest contribution but which he regarded as puerile and generally inadequate. Moreover, he was able to evaluate with considerable ease the elements of the philosophical structure erected by Santayana inasmuch as he was allowed to use Santayana's own annotated texts and to question him on the sources and implications of his doctrine.

As a consequence of this unusual experience, Fr. Butler's evaluation stands uniquely as a contribution of the first order to an understanding of the mind of Santayana. It is not an exaggeration to say that anyone interested in Santayana will have to consult this book, however much he may be unwilling to accept the Thomistic critique of Santayana's philosophy with which it concludes.

The book is divided into three parts. The first part—*Background*—sketches the elements that assisted Santayana in the formulation of his view, the point being here made that the subjective, self-regarding approach to philosophy is in the main the chief conditioning factor of the modern approach, a personal epistemological adjustment to the real, with the present-day philosopher still peering over the shoulders of Descartes and Kant. Santayana was no exception. His main preoccupation was the determination of the nature of the really real, and what we know of it. Conditioned by his passionate attachment to materialism and Platonic idealism, an objectively irreconcilable pair of philosophical attitudes, he evolved his

philosophy of essences. Although he committed himself to a realist position, his relation with reality rests on the most tenuous of premises.

In the second part—*Exposition*—the elements of Santayana's philosophy are set forth: his deification of matter, which is the source of all that is—*psyche* or soul and spirit being mere modifications or evolutions of matter; his notion of essence grasped by intuition, essence having no causal or understood connection with existence, "irrational existence," which alone is the object of knowledge, a knowledge which is achieved by "animal faith," a naive trust or crude belief that something is "outside." The principal occupation of the philosopher is the contemplation of the essences, an experience of mystical exaltation and beauty in which knowledge as such plays no part.

The third part—*Criticism*—passes a penetrating judgment on the flaws in Santayana's philosophy, and is to be recommended as a general epistemological critique on all the quasi-realist attempts to bridge the gap between "what knows" and "what is to be known." Here the author points out definitively where Santayana's theory has been tried at the bar of common sense and the degree to which it has been found wanting.

The last few pages of the book—*In Retrospect*—contain some personal reflections of the author on the last days of Santayana. Without doubt the only one who will ever understand this unfortunate man will be a Catholic. The Catholic faith was like a magnet that drew him throughout his life. His whole life was a twisted tribute to the faith he admired but could not accept. While he resisted its implications, he loved the beauty of the liturgy, the person of Christ, the doctrinal orderliness of the Catholic Church. He revered the Blessed Virgin and upbraided Protestantism for having rejected her role in Christian life. At the same time he vigorously maintained his materialism to the end. As one author has put his viewpoint: "there is no God and Mary is His Mother." Only a Catholic priest could have written the last word on Santayana. Fr. Butler has had that honor.

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Toward the Summit. By RAYMOND LEOPOLD BRUCKBERGER, O.P. Translated by Sister M. Camille, O.S.F. and Alastair Guinan. New York: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1956. Pp. 160. $2.75.

This volume comprises three essays on the spiritual life written by Father Bruckberger for French periodicals. For this reason there is lacking a unity of theme which the reader may fail to understand unless he has read the fine print on the fly-leaf. He will be at a loss in comprehending how

anyone who needed the first lecture (and the author explicitly aims this essay at those who need it) could possibly understand the third. For the first essay (Credo in Unum Deum), on the existence and attributes of God, is written for that large segment of modern society which either denies God's existence or has an altogether irrational concept of His nature. The third essay (The Role of the Saint in Human Society) is written not only for those who know God but who love or desire to love Him. In between these two extremes is a treatise (Returning to God) by the one way given to man—the Sacred Humanity of Jesus Christ, the Way, the Truth and the Life.

In the first essay Father Bruckberger starts from that dead end of the modern world, Nietzsche's "Annunciation": God is DEAD, and proceeds to prove from reason that God is very much alive. The classic proofs of Aristotle and Aquinas are presented in language alive with vivid imagery and startling example. And the author does not stop when he has proved the existence of the God of reason who satisfies the head, but proceeds to show the necessity of the God of faith who alone can satisfy the empty heart.

Concluding this mission *in partes infidelium* the author passes on to the next essay (by a different translator) in which he presents the Church of Christ as the only solution for the ills of unbelief. And in this piece, whether by accident or design, it seems to this reviewer that there is an abrupt change in style. This is one reason for the work's lack of unity noted above. It seems to have been written not only for a different audience but by a different writer. The first essay shows us a writer completely at home in the language and concepts of modern philosophy. In the second he addresses a Christian audience in the language of Christianity. Catholic readers will be more familiar with the style and content of this essay. That is not to say that it is inferior to the first or that it is lacking in reader-interest. Whatever interest it might lack for those to whom the first essay was addressed, the Catholic reader who may have experienced some difficulty in wading through the involved style of the first will find the second much more his cup-of-tea, for it is as enriched as the first by Father Bruckberger's gift of poetic expression.

In the third essay, which treats of the perfection of the Christian life, the writer makes the mistake of too extensive quotation in a work of such brevity. It is almost as much the work of Péguy and Bernanos as it is of Bruckberger. And in this treatise the author seems to feel that he has a mixed audience—made up for one part of those to whom a defense of the veneration of saints needs to be presented, and on the other of those who can appreciate the mysticism of a St. John of the Cross. In this essay, too, he seems to offer no free ground for the Christian between sinner and saint, between the depths of evil and the heights of holiness. He draws

a frightening picture of a Pharasaical figure which he satirically labels the devotee or "human weed." Yet many of the characteristics of his "devotee" could well apply to the common Christian, nowhere near the heights of sanctity but who is, nevertheless, in earnest about saving his soul: "The devotee is more apt to concentrate upon purity or security in himself than on the honor of God. His basic motivation is fear. He fears Hell; he fears the renunciations which mark the calling of a Christian; he fears to set aside human respect, he skirts all dangers without being ensnared by any of them, just as a canoe shoots the rapids of a river. It might be said of him that he is ever inclined to convert the Christian axiom, 'One must work out his own salvation,' into the profoundly un-Christian and inhuman, 'Every man for himself.' His fear of taking a chance leads to avarice. Now the saint, on the other hand, spends himself without ceasing, so that he may give his whole life to God. The devotee schemes and plans to avoid the slightest expenditure of self, the least experience of suffering in either this world or the next. He gambles, indeed, on holiness; but his gambling is always very careful, like that of those cold gamblers who play roulette to the limit of ten francs each Sunday, but who despise one who would allow himself to be ruined by a passionate love of gambling.

"The devotee goes just so far in sin. He never burns his boats. The sacrament of Penance appears to him as a way in which he may easily reckon up the balance sheet of his evil deeds, whenever his good standing in the sight of God appears definitely uncertain, and achieve once more a clean slate. The devotee is remarkably astute, for he can dispense himself from the obligations incumbent upon members of human society by invoking supernatural privileges, while at the same time he will plead duties of his temporal state in order to excuse his disregard for the stricter construction of the Gospel call to repentance. He is as busy as the beaver who builds his dwelling place in the piles of a dock, and is thus equally at the mercy of the hazards of land and water. And after all this, what? In such an existence where is there room for the Cross of Christ?"

This reviewer could be wrong but it seems to him that Father Bruckberger has given here a perfect description of the imperfectly contrite. And even for such, according to the opinion of the best theologians and the dogmatic declaration of the Church, there is room in our Father's house. It is for such that Purgatory exists. Hell may get not a few who persist in that way of life but Divine Mercy will gather in many by imposing the Cross they dread so much.

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Calvin and Augustine. By Benjamin B. Warfield. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1956. Pp. 515. $4.95.

As a thorough presentation of John Calvin's doctrine on the knowledge of God, this collection of essays by Dr. Warfield is of indubitable value. The author grasps firmly and faithfully adheres to Calvin's principal theses: an innate knowledge of God in man, which is given opportunity to develop through further manifestations of Him in nature and the order of providence; the failure of this knowledge to bear fruit because of the corruption of human nature by sin; and finally, the objective revelation of God, embodied in Scripture, and brought into facus by the "interior testimony of the Holy Ghost."

In the chapter on the "Doctrine of the Trinity," Dr. Warfield credits Calvin with the "elimination of the last remnants of subordinationism, so as to do full justice to the deity of Christ." (p. 230). This statement, together with its exposition, does not appear to render complete justice to the unbroken orthodox tradition of Trinitarian theology. The allegation that within the Church, up to the time of the Geneva Reformer, there lurked a tendency to diminish the Godhead of the Word certainly is not borne out by the examination of the confessions of faith edited in the name of the Roman Catholic Church, from the Council of Nicea to the Council of Trent.

Perhaps the single most significant feature of this volume, however, is indicated clearly in the title. The attempt is made to forge a link of continuity between the doctrine of St. Augustine and the system of Calvin. It is summed up in a proposition cited with approval by Warfield: "Augustine was the precursor of the Reformation, and a precursor without immediate continuers." (p. 472)

The main emphasis in establishing this continuity had to be on St. Augustine's supposed preference of the Scriptures to Tradition and the authority of the Church. In the foreword, J. Marcellus Kik affirms that "Warfield shows that with Augustine the Church was the proximate seat of authority, but not the ultimate seat of authority." (p. vii) The inference to be drawn seems to be that within Augustine's system lies the dormant seed of Calvin's discovery, viz., that only the "interior testimony of the Holy Ghost" could sufficiently guarantee a saving knowledge of God in the Bible.

The author's admission that Augustine differs from the Reformer at least "in the place he gives the Church in communicating . . . grace" (p. 472) is really the foundation of a genuine interpretation of St. Augustine's concept of how the organs of divine revelation are interrelated. Whereas Calvin postulated from the outset an inner voice giving the Scriptures the divine credit they deserve, St. Augustine presupposed their

divine authority as an article of Catholic belief, and then read the Scriptures according to the analogy of faith. Calvin sought to establish faith in the Scriptures by a private and interior criterion, while with Augustine faith, already established, was seeking to penetrate the reality symbolized in the divinely inspired Word: *fides quaerens intellectum*. This is evident even in the places cited by Warfield from the *Confessions* and the *De Trinitate*. (p. 472)

Such an endeavor to make St. Augustine a champion of the Protestant principle shows the importance of understanding the unity of Catholic doctrine in the witness of the Fathers of the Church.

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Sapientia Aquinatis. Relationes, Communicationes et Acta IV Congressus Thomistic Internationalis. Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1956. 2 Vols. Pp. 934.

Although the Fourth International Thomistic Congress was held in Rome in September 1955, the Record of the Proceedings has just been received. In two volumes of almost 1000 pages, it comprises papers read, under three headings or sections, at this Congress. For each section a summary and evaluation of the papers was given to the delegates by two competent authorities.

In the first section—*The Relation of St. Thomas' Teaching to the Sciences in their present state*—twenty-two papers appear, in English, French, Latin, Spanish and German. (Papers were read in these languages in the other groups as well.) These papers treat of various aspects of the relations of Thomism with the natural and physical sciences.

The second section of nineteen papers discusses *The Relation of St. Thomas' Teaching to Hegelian and Marxist Dialectic*, providing some remarkable logical and metaphysical analyses of these two dialectical systems.

In the third section, twenty-five papers discuss *The Relation of St. Thomas' Teaching to Existentialism*. Here are covered various questions raised by Existentialism, with a serious attempt at evaluation both of the positive good in it, as well as of the errors and exaggerations to which it gives rise.

Also included are the Address of welcome to the delegates by His Holiness, Pope Pius XII (which appeared in the Autumn 1955 number of *The Pope Speaks*), together with twelve papers of wider scope read at the General Sessions of the Congress.

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